SQE1 practice questions: how to answer single best answer items

Business Law and Practice · Pre-incorporation contracts

Priya Nair is setting up a restaurant business. On 3 March she signs a five-year lease of premises with the landlord. She signs it "for and on behalf of Spice Route Ltd". The company is not yet incorporated. It is incorporated on 20 March and starts trading from the premises. In June the company stops paying rent. The landlord wants to recover the arrears. The lease contains nothing about who is liable if the company does not exist. Who is liable on the lease?

1. Spice Route Ltd alone, because it began trading from the premises and so adopted the lease.
2. Nobody, because a contract cannot be made with a company that does not yet exist.
3. Spice Route Ltd alone, once its directors ratify the lease after incorporation.
4. Priya, but only if she intended at the time to be personally bound by the lease.
5. Priya is personally liable, because the lease takes effect as a contract made with her.

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Answer: E. Section 51(1) CA 2006 provides that a contract purportedly made by or on behalf of a company before it is formed has effect, subject to any agreement to the contrary, as one made with the person purporting to act for the company. That person is personally liable. Priya signed before incorporation, and the lease has no clause excluding her liability, so she is liable. The company cannot ratify the lease (Kelner v Baxter). It would only become liable if the parties agreed a novation, which creates a new contract. The tempting answer is that the company is liable because it took the benefit of the lease. Trading from the premises does not by itself transfer the contract to the company.

Companies Act 2006, s 51; Kelner v Baxter (1866) LR 2 CP 174

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Business Law and Practice · Removal of directors

Hollis Packaging Ltd is a private company with 100 ordinary shares. Neil holds 30, Asha holds 30 and Greg holds 40. Neil, Asha and Greg are the three directors. Neil and Asha are unhappy with Greg's conduct and want to remove him as a director. The articles are the Model Articles and say nothing special about removal or weighted votes. Greg will oppose removal. Which of the following is the correct way to remove him?

1. Neil and Asha pass a special resolution, as removal alters the constitution of the company.
2. Neil and Asha pass a written resolution, which avoids the need to hold a meeting.
3. Neil and Asha pass an ordinary resolution at a general meeting called on special notice, and Greg may make representations.
4. Neil and Asha pass a board resolution, as they form a majority of the directors.
5. Neil and Asha pass an ordinary resolution on 14 days' notice, as for any general meeting.

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Answer: C. Section 168(1) CA 2006 lets a company remove a director by ordinary resolution at a meeting, despite anything in the articles or any agreement. Section 312 requires special notice, which means the company must receive notice of the resolution at least 28 days before the meeting. Section 169 lets the director make written representations and speak at the meeting. Neil and Asha hold 60% of the votes, which is enough for an ordinary resolution. The tempting answer is a written resolution, because it looks quicker. Section 288(2) excludes it for removing a director, so the meeting route is compulsory.

Companies Act 2006, s 168; Companies Act 2006, s 169; Companies Act 2006, s 312; Companies Act 2006, s 288(2)

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Business Law and Practice · Directors' duties: substantial property transactions

Brindle Foods Ltd has net assets of £500,000 according to its latest accounts. The sole shareholder other than Karim is his sister, Samira. Karim is a director. He proposes to buy a delivery van from the company for £90,000. The company has no other directors' contracts needing approval. The van is a non-cash asset. Karim says the sale needs no approval from the shareholders because the price is below £100,000. Is Karim correct?

1. Yes, because the requisite value is £100,000 and the price is lower than that figure.
2. No, because £90,000 exceeds 10% of the company's net assets and £5,000, so the shareholders must approve.
3. Yes, because approval is needed only where the director is buying from a listed company.
4. No, but the approval needed is a resolution of the board without Karim voting.
5. Yes, because a sale to a director is permitted if he declares his interest under s 177.

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Answer: B. Section 190 CA 2006 requires prior approval by members of a substantial property transaction between a company and a director. Section 191 says a non-cash asset is substantial if its value exceeds £100,000, or exceeds 10% of the company's asset value and is more than £5,000. Net assets are £500,000, so 10% is £50,000. The van is worth £90,000, which is above £50,000 and above £5,000. The transaction is substantial. Karim has looked only at the £100,000 limb. A s 177 declaration of interest is also needed, but it does not remove the need for member approval.

Companies Act 2006, s 190; Companies Act 2006, s 191; Companies Act 2006, s 177

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Business Law and Practice · Shareholder resolutions

Orchard Lane Ltd has 100 ordinary shares, each with one vote. Dev holds 40, Eleni holds 35 and Frank holds 25. Dev and Eleni want to amend the articles to add a right of pre-emption on share transfers. Frank opposes the change. A general meeting is properly called, all three attend and a poll is taken. Dev and Eleni vote in favour, Frank votes against. Nothing in the articles entrenches the relevant provisions. What is the result?

1. The resolution is passed, because a special resolution needs a majority of not less than 75% and Dev and Eleni hold exactly 75%.
2. The resolution fails, because a special resolution needs a majority of more than 75%.
3. The resolution is passed, because an ordinary resolution of more than 50% is enough to amend the articles.
4. The resolution fails, because Frank's 25% allows him to block any change to the articles.
5. The resolution fails, because amending the articles needs the consent of every member.

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Answer: A. Section 21 CA 2006 allows a company to amend its articles by special resolution. Section 283 defines a special resolution as one passed by a majority of not less than 75% of votes cast. Dev and Eleni hold 75 of the 100 votes cast on the poll, so the threshold is met exactly. The tempting answer is that the vote fails because the majority must be over 75%. The statute says not less than 75%, so exactly 75% passes. Frank would need more than 25% of the votes cast to block the resolution.

Companies Act 2006, s 21; Companies Act 2006, s 283

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Business Law and Practice · Company meetings: short notice

Tavistock Paints Ltd is a private company. Its 200 ordinary shares are held equally by ten members, 20 shares each. A general meeting is urgently needed to pass an ordinary resolution approving a loan to a director. The directors send notice of a meeting to be held in 5 days. Nine members agree to the short notice in writing. The tenth member does not respond. The articles say nothing on short notice. Is the meeting validly called?

1. No, because every member must agree before a general meeting can be held on short notice.
2. No, because a general meeting of a private company always needs at least 14 days' notice.
3. Yes, because ordinary resolutions can be passed on any notice that the directors consider reasonable.
4. Yes, because a majority in number of the members, holding at least 90% in nominal value of the voting shares, have agreed.
5. No, because the agreement must come from members holding at least 95% in nominal value.

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Answer: D. Section 307(1) CA 2006 requires 14 days' notice for a general meeting of a private company. Under s 307(4) to (6), a meeting may be called on shorter notice if it is agreed by a majority in number of the members having a right to attend and vote, who together hold at least 90% in nominal value of the voting shares. The articles may raise the figure to no more than 95%, but these articles are silent. Nine of ten members is a majority in number, and their 180 shares are exactly 90% of the 200 shares. The meeting is valid. The tempting answer is that all members must agree. That rule does not apply to a general meeting of a private company.

Companies Act 2006, s 307

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Business Law and Practice · Directors' duties: conflicts of interest

Lena is a director of Greenway Cleaning Ltd. At a client dinner, she hears that a nearby depot is for sale at a bargain price. Greenway cannot afford it and the board has no interest in expanding. Lena buys the depot personally and leases it to a competitor. She did not tell the board. Greenway's articles do not authorise conflicts. The other directors learn of this a year later. Which statement best describes Lena's position?

1. She breached no duty, because Greenway could not have afforded the depot and so lost nothing.
2. She breached s 172 only, because the duty to promote success is the only relevant duty.
3. She breached s 175, because she exploited an opportunity she learned of as a director, whether or not the company could have taken it.
4. She breached s 177 only, because she did not declare an interest in a proposed transaction with the company.
5. She breached no duty, because the opportunity came to her at a social event and not at work.

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Answer: C. Section 175(1) CA 2006 requires a director to avoid a situation in which they have, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or may conflict, with the company's interests. Section 175(2) applies in particular to the exploitation of property, information or opportunity, and it is irrelevant whether the company could take advantage of it. Lena used an opportunity she learned of through her role and took it for herself without authorisation from the board (s 175(4)(b)). The tempting answer is that there was no loss because Greenway could not afford the depot. That is the very argument s 175(2) rejects. She may have to account for any profit.

Companies Act 2006, s 175; Companies Act 2006, s 177

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Dispute Resolution · Pre-action conduct

Brightwater Joinery Ltd is owed £38,000 under an unpaid invoice by Calder Housing Ltd. No pre-action protocol covers this type of dispute. The managing director of Brightwater tells you, a trainee solicitor, that Calder will only delay, so he wants to issue a claim form today without writing first. You are asked what the Practice Direction on Pre-Action Conduct expects. Which of the following statements is most accurate?

1. Brightwater may issue at once because the Practice Direction applies only where a specific pre-action protocol also applies
2. Brightwater must wait three months after its letter before issuing, because that is the fixed minimum response period
3. Brightwater must complete mediation before issue, and the court will strike out any claim issued without it
4. Brightwater should write to Calder with concise details of the claim and allow a reasonable time to respond, and unreasonable non-compliance can lead to costs and interest sanctions
5. Brightwater risks having its claim barred by limitation if it does not send a letter before claim

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Answer: D. The Practice Direction on Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols applies where no specific protocol covers the dispute. Para 6 expects the claimant to write with concise details of the claim and the defendant to respond within a reasonable time, which is 14 days in a straightforward case and no more than 3 months in a very complex one. The parties should also consider ADR. Under paras 13 to 16 the court may take non-compliance into account and make orders about costs, interest and stays. Here a £38,000 invoice debt is straightforward, so a short response period suits. Issuing at once because the client expects delay is the tempting but wrong approach: non-compliance is punished in costs, not by automatic strike out.

Practice Direction on Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols, paras 6, 8 to 11 and 13 to 16

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Dispute Resolution · Limitation

Mrs Okafor suffered gradual hearing loss while working at a factory. On 12 January 2025 an audiologist told her the loss was probably caused by years of exposure to loud machinery. She was aware of her symptoms long before, but assume she could not reasonably have known earlier that they were linked to her work. She instructs your firm on 9 November 2026 to claim damages for negligence against the former employer. Ignore any argument on discretion. By when must a claim be issued to be in time?

1. 12 January 2031, being six years from the date of the audiologist's report
2. 12 January 2028, being three years from the date on which she first knew that the injury was significant and attributable to the employer's act or omission
3. 9 November 2029, being three years from the date she instructed your firm
4. The date three years after her symptoms first appeared, so the claim is probably already out of time
5. 12 January 2037, being twelve years from the audiologist's report

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Answer: B. For personal injury the primary period is three years from the date the cause of action accrued or, if later, the date of knowledge (Limitation Act 1980, s 11(4)). Under s 14 the date of knowledge is when the claimant first knew the injury was significant, was attributable to the act or omission alleged, and who the defendant was. On the assumed facts there is no earlier constructive knowledge under s 14(3), and Mrs Okafor only learned of attribution to the employer on 12 January 2025, so the three years end on 12 January 2028. The tempting wrong answer is to count from when the symptoms began. That ignores the later date of knowledge. Section 33 gives the court a discretion to disapply the period, but the question tells you to ignore it.

Limitation Act 1980, ss 11 and 14

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Dispute Resolution · Service of the claim form

A claim form was issued by the county court on 17 September 2026. The claimant's solicitor posted it by first class post to the defendant's usual residence on 17 January 2027, a Sunday. The defendant's solicitor argues that the claim form was served out of time, because it will be deemed served on 19 January, which is after the four-month period. Is the argument correct?

1. Yes, because the claim form must be deemed served, not merely posted, within four months of issue
2. Yes, because a step taken on a Sunday is invalid and posting must be done on a business day
3. No, because the claim form remains valid for six months and no step is required in the first four
4. No, because the claimant need only complete the step required for service before midnight on the calendar day four months after issue, and posting on 17 January does that
5. No, because the claimant can serve at any time provided the particulars of claim are served within 14 days

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Answer: D. A claim form must be served within four months of issue, but r 7.5(1) tests this by reference to the step taken: before 12 midnight on the calendar day four months after issue, the claimant must complete the relevant step, such as posting by first class post. Four months after 17 September is 17 January, so posting that day satisfies r 7.5. Deemed service under r 6.14 (the second business day after the step) is used to calculate the defendant's time to respond, not to test validity. The defendant's argument confuses the two dates. If the step had been missed, the claimant would need an extension under r 7.6, which is hard to obtain after expiry.

CPR r 7.5(1); CPR r 6.14; CPR r 7.6

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Dispute Resolution · Time limits for response

A claimant posted the claim form and particulars of claim together by first class post on Monday 5 October 2026. Both were deemed served as provided in the CPR. The defendant filed an acknowledgment of service on 12 October. Assume no bank holidays fall in the period and that no extension is agreed. What is the last day for the defendant to file a defence?

1. Wednesday 21 October 2026
2. Monday 9 November 2026
3. Monday 2 November 2026
4. Wednesday 4 November 2026
5. Wednesday 18 November 2026

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Answer: D. Where particulars of claim are served with the claim form, the claim form is deemed served on the second business day after the step is taken (CPR r 6.14), here Wednesday 7 October. The defence is due 14 days after service of the particulars, or 28 days after service if the defendant has filed an acknowledgment of service (r 15.4(1)). The defendant did acknowledge service, so the 28 days run from 7 October and end on Wednesday 4 November. The tempting wrong choice, 21 October, forgets the longer period that an acknowledgment of service gives. Counting from the date of posting is also wrong, because deemed service controls.

CPR r 6.14; CPR r 15.4(1)

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Dispute Resolution · Extending time by agreement

You act for Dalton Logistics Ltd, the defendant to a £60,000 contract claim. The defence is due on 4 December. You need time to obtain documents from a client based overseas. You ask the claimant's solicitor, who agrees in an email to a 40-day extension. You propose to rely on that agreement and do nothing else. Which of the following is the correct position?

1. The agreement is effective for 40 days because the parties control time limits unless the court has fixed them
2. The parties may agree an extension of no more than 28 days and the defendant must notify the court in writing, so a longer period needs a court order
3. The agreement is effective for 28 days and the court need not be told, because it is a private arrangement
4. The agreement has no effect at all, so only the court can extend time for filing a defence
5. The agreement is effective for 40 days if the claimant has not requested default judgment by then

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Answer: B. CPR r 15.5 allows the parties to agree that the time for filing a defence is extended by up to 28 days, and the defendant must notify the court in writing of the agreement. A longer period cannot be agreed. Dalton must therefore either settle for a 28-day extension or apply under Part 23 for an order. Relying on the 40-day email is dangerous: from day 29 the defendant would be in default and the claimant could request default judgment.

CPR r 15.5

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Dispute Resolution · Default judgment

The defendant's defence was due on 3 November. It was filed late, on 9 November. On 10 November, the claimant's clerk, unaware of the filing, requested judgment in default of defence and the court entered judgment for £22,000. The defendant's solicitor applies to set the judgment aside. Which of the following describes how the court must approach the application?

1. It may set the judgment aside only if the defendant shows a real prospect of successfully defending the claim
2. It may set it aside only if the defendant also explains the delay and pays the claimant's costs first
3. It must set the judgment aside, because it was wrongly entered once a defence had been filed before the request was made
4. It must refuse, because the defence was filed after the deadline and the claimant was entitled to judgment
5. It must refuse, because the application was not made within 14 days of the judgment

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Answer: C. Default judgment under Part 12 is available only if the defendant has not filed a defence by the deadline when the request is made (r 12.3(2)). A defence filed late but before the request defeats the entitlement. Under r 13.2 the court must set aside a judgment that was wrongly entered, for example because the r 12.3 conditions were not met. The defendant need not show a real prospect of defending. That is the test in r 13.3 for judgments that were correctly entered, where the court has a discretion. The tempting wrong answer treats lateness as decisive. It is not, because only the position at the date of the request counts.

CPR r 12.3(2); CPR r 13.2; CPR r 13.3

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Contract Law · Offer and acceptance

Brightpath Training Ltd publishes an advertisement promising to pay £2,000 to any student who completes its 12-week software course and then fails to obtain a job within three months. The advertisement says the company has deposited £50,000 with its bank to meet such claims. Priya completes the course, does not find work in three months, and claims £2,000. Brightpath says the advertisement was only a marketing statement and that Priya never told it she was relying on the offer. Which of the following best describes the legal position?

1. The advertisement is an invitation to treat, so Brightpath made no offer that Priya could accept.
2. The advertisement is a mere puff, because adverts are never intended to create legal relations.
3. There is a binding unilateral offer, accepted by Priya completing the course, and she did not need to notify acceptance first.
4. There is an offer, but Priya must show she told Brightpath of her acceptance before starting the course.
5. There is no consideration, because Priya's course fees benefited only Brightpath and not Priya.

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Answer: C. An advertisement can be an offer to the world if it is clear and shows an intention to be bound. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co is the classic authority. The deposit of £50,000 shows serious intention, which defeats the 'mere puff' argument. The offer is unilateral: it is accepted by performing the stated conditions, and the offeror is taken to have waived the need for notice of acceptance. Priya gave consideration by completing the course in reliance on the promise. The tempting answer is that the advert is an invitation to treat. That rule applies to ordinary displays and adverts that are vague or invite offers, but not to a clear promise such as this one.

Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256

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Contract Law · Consideration

While Ravi was abroad for a month, his neighbour Dev, without being asked, repaired storm damage to Ravi's garden fence at a cost of £800. When Ravi returned and saw the work, he said, 'That was kind of you. I will pay you £800 on the first of next month.' He did not pay. Dev asks you whether he can enforce the promise. Which of the following is the best advice?

1. The promise is enforceable, because Dev's work is good consideration provided it benefited Ravi.
2. The promise is probably unenforceable, because Dev's work was done before the promise and not at Ravi's request.
3. The promise is enforceable, because past consideration is valid if the work was of value to the promisor.
4. The promise is enforceable under the Pao On exception, because the work was later acknowledged by Ravi.
5. The promise is enforceable under promissory estoppel, because Dev relied on it by repairing the fence.

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Answer: B. Consideration must move from the promisee and must not be past. An act done before and independently of the promise is past consideration (Re McArdle). Pao On v Lau Yiu Long allows an exception where the act was done at the promisor's request, both parties understood it would be paid for, and the later promise would have been legally enforceable. Dev acted without any request, so the exception fails. The tempting answer is Pao On: Ravi's later acknowledgement does not supply the missing prior request. Dev's remedy is limited, perhaps to a restitution claim, which is difficult for unrequested work.

Re McArdle [1951] Ch 669; Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614

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Contract Law · Intention to create legal relations

Anita and her husband Kofi separated. Kofi signed a short written note promising to pay Anita £300 a month towards the children's costs if she took over the repayments on their joint car loan. Anita made the car loan repayments for the next two years. Kofi has now stopped paying, saying that the note was only a private family arrangement. Which of the following is the best analysis?

1. The note is unenforceable, because spouses are conclusively presumed not to intend legal relations.
2. The note is unenforceable, because Anita's car loan repayments were past consideration.
3. The note is enforceable only if it was signed in the presence of a witness.
4. The presumption against legal intention in domestic arrangements does not apply in the same way to separated spouses, so the note is likely enforceable.
5. The note is unenforceable, because agreements between spouses need an express statement that the parties intend to be bound.

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Answer: D. Domestic and social agreements are presumed not to create legal relations (Balfour v Balfour), but the presumption is rebuttable. It is weak or absent where the spouses have separated and record their arrangement in clear terms. In Merritt v Merritt, a husband who had left the home signed a note making promises to his wife in return for her paying off the mortgage, and the promise was enforced. Here the note was written, signed, specific and made on separation, and Anita performed her side by making the loan repayments. The tempting answer is that spouses are always presumed not to intend legal relations. That presumption is rebuttable, and the separation and written terms rebut it.

Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571; Merritt v Merritt [1970] 1 WLR 1211

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Contract Law · Terms and exclusion clauses

Norgate Print Ltd, a small printing firm, signed a supplier's standard-form contract for a new press without reading it. A clause in small print limited the supplier's liability for any defect to £5,000. The press fails and Norgate suffers £80,000 of loss. Norgate says it never saw the clause and that the supplier did nothing to draw it to its attention. Both parties are businesses and the contract is on the supplier's written standard terms. Which of the following is the best statement of the position?

1. Norgate is not bound, because the supplier failed to give reasonable notice of the clause.
2. Norgate is bound, and the clause is valid because the Consumer Rights Act 2015 does not apply between businesses.
3. Norgate is not bound, because limitation clauses in small print are void unless explained orally.
4. Norgate is bound by the clause because it signed, but the clause must satisfy the UCTA 1977 reasonableness test.
5. Norgate is bound, because no statute controls limitation clauses between businesses that deal on written standard terms.

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Answer: D. A person who signs a contractual document is bound by its terms, whether or not they have read them (L'Estrange v Graucob), unless there is misrepresentation or similar vitiating factor. Notice rules apply to unsigned documents. However, because the contract is on the supplier's written standard terms, section 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 applies. A clause limiting liability for breach of contract is effective only if it satisfies the reasonableness test in section 11 and Schedule 2. The tempting answer is that lack of notice frees Norgate. Notice matters for unsigned documents, but here the signature binds and the real challenge is reasonableness.

L'Estrange v Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394; Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, ss 3, 11

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Contract Law · Terms and representations

Gareth, a buyer with no knowledge of classic cars, visits Hartwell Classics, a specialist dealer. The dealer's owner says, 'This Jaguar has done only 40,000 miles since its engine rebuild; I checked the rebuild records myself.' Gareth buys it for £28,000 without asking for anything in writing. The written invoice is silent on mileage. He later learns the car has done 95,000 miles since the rebuild. Which of the following is the best analysis of the statement?

1. It is likely a term of the contract, because the dealer had special knowledge and Gareth relied on it.
2. It is a mere representation, because it was oral and the invoice does not mention it.
3. It is a mere representation, because the dealer did not promise that the statement was true.
4. It is a term only if Gareth asked for it to be put in writing before buying.
5. It is a term, but only a warranty, because the statement concerned mileage rather than ownership.

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Answer: A. Whether a pre-contract statement is a term or a mere representation depends on the parties' objective intention. Relevant factors are the importance of the statement, any lapse of time, whether the contract was put in writing, and the relative knowledge of the parties. Where the maker has special knowledge and the other does not, the statement is more likely a term (Dick Bentley Productions v Harold Smith (Motors); contrast Oscar Chess v Williams). The dealer claimed to have checked the records and Gareth relied on that. The tempting answer is that a silent invoice makes it a mere representation. Absent an entire agreement clause, that is not decisive. Gareth can sue for breach of contract and may also have a misrepresentation claim.

Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 623; Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370

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Contract Law · Implied terms and consumer rights

Lena buys a washing machine from an online retailer for £540 for use at home. It is delivered on 3 May. On 24 May it stops working because of an inherent manufacturing fault. The retailer offers to send an engineer to repair it. Lena wants her money back. Which of the following best states Lena's rights under the Consumer Rights Act 2015?

1. She must accept the repair offer first, because the right to reject exists only after a failed repair.
2. She may claim only a price reduction, because the fault is not serious enough to justify rejection.
3. She may reject only if the retailer is given 30 days to attempt a repair.
4. She has no statutory right, because the contract was made at a distance and not in a shop.
5. She may exercise the short-term right to reject and claim a full refund, because the fault appeared within 30 days.

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Answer: E. Goods in a consumer contract must be of satisfactory quality (Consumer Rights Act 2015, s 9). If they are not, the consumer has a short-term right to reject, which normally lasts 30 days from delivery (s 22). On rejection the consumer is entitled to a refund (s 20), and no deduction for use can be made on a short-term rejection. After that period, or if the consumer chooses not to reject, the right to require repair or replacement (s 23) applies, with price reduction or the final right to reject only if those fail. Lena's machine failed on day 21. She may therefore reject outright. The tempting answer is that the trader may insist on repair first. That is true only outside the 30-day window or if the consumer elects repair.

Consumer Rights Act 2015, ss 9, 19, 20, 22, 23

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Tort · Duty of care

Constable Reid was chasing a shoplifter through a crowded market. He tackled the suspect carelessly, and both men fell against a stall. Parts of the stall collapsed and injured Mrs Idowu, a stallholder. She sues the chief constable. The chief constable argues that police owe no duty of care to members of the public when carrying out arrests, for policy reasons. Which of the following is the best analysis?

1. There is no duty, because the police have a general immunity from negligence claims when making arrests.
2. There is a duty only if Mrs Idowu shows that the Caparo three-stage test is satisfied on these facts.
3. The police owe a duty to take reasonable care not to cause foreseeable physical injury by their own positive acts, as any other person would.
4. There is a duty only if the police had assumed responsibility for her safety before the arrest.
5. There is no duty, because the harm was caused by the shoplifter's wrongdoing and not by the police.

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Answer: C. A person owes a duty of care to take reasonable care not to cause foreseeable physical injury by positive acts. The Supreme Court in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police held that the police are subject to the ordinary law of negligence in this respect. The Caparo test is not a universal three-stage test to be applied afresh. Courts follow established categories and develop the law incrementally by analogy. Immunity and the policy concerns in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire relate to failures to protect the public from third parties, which are omissions. Constable Reid's careless tackle was a positive act. The tempting answer is that police have immunity. That is not the law.

Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2018] UKSC 4; Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605

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Tort · Duty of care: omissions and third parties

Calder Developments Ltd owned an empty warehouse awaiting demolition. It had locked the doors and fixed the fence. It had never had any trespassers, vandalism or fires on site. One night, unknown intruders broke in and started a fire. The fire spread to the neighbouring premises of Pip's Bakery, which was destroyed. Pip's Bakery sues Calder, arguing that an owner of land is liable for any fire that begins there. Which of the following is the best analysis?

1. Calder is liable, because an occupier is strictly liable for fire spreading from its land.
2. Calder is liable, because it created the danger by leaving the building empty.
3. Calder is not liable only because the intruders' crime breaks the chain of causation in every case.
4. Calder is liable, because a neighbour is always owed a duty to protect against every foreseeable risk.
5. Calder is unlikely to be liable, because there is generally no duty to prevent third parties causing harm unless the owner knew or should have known of a real risk.

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Answer: E. The law does not generally impose a duty to prevent harm caused by the deliberate acts of third parties. In Smith v Littlewoods Organisation, owners of an empty cinema were not liable for fire started by vandals that spread to neighbouring property, because they had no knowledge of the risk of such an act and no previous warning. A duty may arise where the defendant creates the danger or has control and knowledge of a real risk (Home Office v Dorset Yacht; Lord Goff in Smith). Calder had secured the building and had no history of trespass or fire. The tempting answer is that occupiers are liable for fires on their land. Ordinary fire liability depends on negligence and on duty.

Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241; Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004

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Tort · Breach of duty: standard of care

Lucas, a learner driver in his first week of lessons, was driving on a quiet road with his instructor, Mrs Fry, in the passenger seat. He failed to brake in time and struck Kamal, a pedestrian on a crossing, causing a broken leg. Lucas's solicitor says that Lucas should be judged against the standard of a beginner and so was not negligent. Which of the following is the best statement of the standard of care?

1. Lucas is judged against the standard of a reasonable learner driver at the same stage of lessons.
2. Lucas is judged against the standard of the reasonably competent and experienced driver, whatever his own experience.
3. Lucas is judged against the standard of a reasonable person who does not hold a driving licence.
4. Lucas is judged against the standard of his driving instructor, who was responsible for supervising him.
5. Lucas is judged against a lower standard if he shows that he did his personal best.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: B. The standard of care in negligence is objective: the reasonable person in the defendant's position. For driving, Nettleship v Weston held that a learner driver is judged against the standard of a reasonably competent and experienced driver. Road users are entitled to expect the same safe driving, and liability is not reduced because of inexperience. Lucas therefore breached his duty if a competent driver would have braked in time. Kamal is not concerned with Lucas's skill. The tempting answer is a lower standard for learners. The law refuses this because the test protects other road users, and compulsory insurance means the loss is usually met by the insurer.

Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691

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Tort · Causation

Sunita attended A&E at 8 pm complaining of severe vomiting after drinking tea at work. The duty doctor, without examining her, sent her home. Sunita died at 2 am from arsenic poisoning. Expert evidence is that, even if the doctor had examined her and given the correct treatment at once, she would have died at the same time because the antidote could not have been given in time. Her husband sues the hospital in negligence. Which of the following is the likely outcome?

1. The claim fails on causation, because Sunita would have died anyway and the breach made no difference.
2. The claim succeeds, because the doctor owed a duty and breached it by failing to examine Sunita.
3. The claim succeeds in part, because the doctor's breach materially contributed to the death.
4. The claim succeeds, because the hospital caused a loss of a chance of survival.
5. The claim fails, because a doctor can never be liable for a failure to examine.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: A. The claimant must prove on the balance of probabilities that the defendant's breach caused the damage. The primary test is the but for test: would the harm have occurred but for the breach? In Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington HMC, hospital staff negligently failed to examine a man who had arsenic poisoning, but he would have died anyway, so the claim failed. Here, the evidence shows Sunita would have died at the same time with proper treatment. The breach made no difference. The tempting answer is that the duty and breach settle liability. Causation is a separate element and can defeat the claim.

Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428

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Tort · Causation: material increase in risk

Mr Hollis developed mesothelioma at age 70. In his working life he was negligently exposed to asbestos dust by three different employers, each for several years. Mesothelioma can be triggered by a single fibre, and medical science cannot show which employer's exposure caused the disease. Two of the employers are still solvent. Mr Hollis sues them. They argue that he cannot satisfy the but for test against either one. Which of the following is the best analysis?

1. The claim fails, because he cannot prove on the balance of probabilities which employer caused the disease.
2. The claim succeeds only against the employer with the longest exposure, as that is the most probable cause.
3. The claim succeeds only for a share of damages, proportionate to each employer's exposure, and the claimant bears any shortfall.
4. The Fairchild exception applies, and each responsible employer may be liable for the whole damage, subject to contribution between them.
5. The claim succeeds against both employers because the but for test is never applied to industrial disease.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: D. Normally the claimant must prove causation on the balance of probabilities by the but for test. In Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services, the House of Lords created an exception for mesothelioma, where a defendant who negligently exposed the claimant to asbestos and materially increased the risk of the disease is liable even if the claimant cannot show which exposure caused it. Section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006 reversed the effect of Barker v Corus and makes each responsible person liable for the whole damage, with the right to claim contribution from the others. Mr Hollis may therefore recover in full from either solvent employer. The tempting answer is that he must fail on the but for test. The exception was created because of the evidential impossibility.

Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22; Compensation Act 2006, s 3

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Tort · Remoteness of damage

Moira worked in a foundry. Her employer negligently failed to provide a visor, and a splash of molten metal burned her lip. The burn was a foreseeable injury. Unknown to anyone, she had a dormant pre-cancerous condition in the lip tissue. The burn triggered it, she developed cancer, and she died three years later. Her employer argues that cancer was not a foreseeable result of a burn. Which of the following is the best analysis?

1. The employer is liable only for the burn, because the cancer was a different and unforeseeable type of harm.
2. The employer is not liable for anything, because the cancer was a novus actus interveniens.
3. The employer is liable for the cancer only if the specific condition was known to the employer.
4. The employer is liable for the cancer, because a foreseeable type of harm occurred and the defendant takes the claimant as found.
5. The employer is liable for the cancer, because remoteness does not apply to personal injury cases.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: D. Damage must not be too remote. Under The Wagon Mound (No 1), the claimant recovers for damage of a type that was reasonably foreseeable. Once a type of harm is foreseeable, the defendant is liable for its full extent, and takes the victim as found (the eggshell skull rule). In Smith v Leech Brain, a burn on the lip from molten metal triggered cancer in a man with a latent predisposition, and the employer was liable for his death. Moira's employer could foresee a burn. It need not have foreseen the cancer or her susceptibility. The tempting answer is to separate the cancer as a new type of harm. The courts treat it as a consequence of the foreseeable burn.

Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock (The Wagon Mound) (No 1) [1961] AC 388; Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd [1962] 2 QB 405

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Legal System, Constitutional and EU Law · Parliamentary sovereignty and the Parliament Acts

A government Bill about regional bus subsidies passes the House of Commons but is rejected by the House of Lords. It is not a Money Bill and does not extend the life of Parliament. In the next session the Commons passes an identical Bill again, more than one year after its second reading in the first session, and the Lords again reject it. A client asks whether the Bill can still become law. What is the best advice?

1. No. A Bill cannot become law without the approval of both Houses, and the Lords may reject any Bill indefinitely
2. Yes, but the court may then strike it down as invalid because it was not made with the Lords' consent
3. Yes. Under the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 the Bill can be presented for Royal Assent without the Lords' consent, and the resulting Act is a valid Act of Parliament
4. No. The Lords' veto can be overridden only for Money Bills, which are certified by the Speaker
5. Yes, but only after the Lords have been given a further period of 12 months to reconsider it

Show answer and explanation

Answer: C. The House of Lords has only a limited power to block legislation. Under the Parliament Act 1911, as amended by the Parliament Act 1949, a public Bill (other than a Money Bill or a Bill to extend the life of Parliament) that the Commons passes in two successive sessions, with at least one year between the second reading in the first session and the third reading in the second, can be presented for Royal Assent without the Lords' agreement. In R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 the House of Lords held that Acts made this way are valid primary legislation. The Bill here meets the conditions. A candidate who says that both Houses must always agree forgets the Parliament Acts.

Parliament Act 1911, s 2; Parliament Act 1949; R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56

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Legal System, Constitutional and EU Law · Implied repeal

Parliament passed the Street Markets Act 2010, which provides that a person holding a council stall licence may trade on any public road without any other permission. In 2024 it passed the Highway Safety Act, which says that no trading is permitted on a public road without a police permit. The Highway Safety Act does not mention the 2010 Act. A stallholder with a council licence is prosecuted for trading without a police permit and argues that the 2010 Act still protects him. Which is the best analysis?

1. The later Act prevails to the extent of the inconsistency, because under the doctrine of implied repeal Parliament cannot bind its successors and the earlier ordinary Act is impliedly repealed
2. The 2010 Act prevails, because an earlier Act can be overridden only by an Act that expressly names it
3. The court must declare the later Act incompatible, because it conflicts with the earlier statutory right
4. The 2010 Act prevails, because it was passed first and creates vested rights that Parliament cannot remove
5. The court may choose which of the two Acts to apply according to which better serves public safety

Show answer and explanation

Answer: A. Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can make or unmake any law and that no Parliament can bind its successors. Where two ordinary Acts conflict, the later one prevails by implied repeal (Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590). In Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), the court said that constitutional statutes are not impliedly repealed and need express words or a specific, unambiguous intention, but a Street Markets Act is an ordinary statute. The stallholder's council licence therefore gives no defence to the later requirement for a police permit. The court cannot ignore the later Act or choose between them.

Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590; Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin)

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Legal System, Constitutional and EU Law · Constitutional conventions

A campaign group argues that the UK Government has breached a constitutional convention by introducing a Bill affecting a devolved matter without the consent of the Senedd, contrary to the Sewel convention. It asks you whether it can ask the High Court to stop the Bill. Which is the best advice?

1. The court can enforce the convention by quashing the Bill, because a convention is part of the common law
2. The court can recognise that the convention exists but cannot enforce it, because conventions are political rules and not legally enforceable
3. The court can enforce it by an injunction against the Government, since Parliament has put the convention into statute
4. The court can enforce it because breach of the convention makes the Bill ultra vires and void
5. The court must refuse to hear the matter at all, because it cannot even say whether the convention exists

Show answer and explanation

Answer: B. Constitutional conventions are rules of political practice that the Government and Parliament follow, but they are not enforceable in courts. Courts may acknowledge that a convention exists, but they do not enforce it (Attorney General v Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] QB 752). In R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 the Supreme Court held that the Sewel convention, although recognised in the Scotland Act 1998, s 28(8) and later Acts, remains a political convention and the courts cannot police it. The same reasoning applies to the Welsh version in the Government of Wales Act 2006, s 107(6). The tempting view, that statutory recognition turns it into a legal rule, is exactly the argument the Supreme Court rejected.

R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5; Scotland Act 1998, s 28(8); Attorney General v Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] QB 752; Government of Wales Act 2006, s 107(6)

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Legal System, Constitutional and EU Law · Royal prerogative

The Marine Salvage Act 2015 (a fictional Act) gives the Home Secretary power to grant salvage licences and lists the only grounds on which a licence may be refused. The Home Secretary announces that, under the royal prerogative, she will also refuse licences to anyone who has attended a particular protest, which the statute does not allow. A client who has been refused asks whether the prerogative can be used in this way. What is the best advice?

1. Yes. The prerogative is superior to statute because it comes from the Crown and cannot be limited by Parliament
2. No. Where a statute covers the field, the prerogative power is displaced or limited, and the Crown cannot use it to override the statutory scheme
3. Yes. The courts have no power to review prerogative powers because they are all matters of high policy
4. No, but only if the client first obtains a declaration of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act
5. Yes, but only if the protest was unlawful, in which case the Crown can impose any penalty it chooses

Show answer and explanation

Answer: B. The royal prerogative is the residue of the Crown's historic discretionary powers, now exercised by ministers. Parliament is sovereign and may abolish or regulate any prerogative power. Where a statute deals with the same subject, the prerogative is displaced or cannot be used to contradict it (Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508). Courts also decide whether a prerogative power exists and its extent (Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374; R (Miller) v Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41), although some matters, such as the making of treaties, are generally unsuitable for review. The Act regulates salvage licences, so the Home Secretary cannot rely on the prerogative to add a new ground of refusal.

Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508; Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374; R (Miller) v Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41

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Legal System, Constitutional and EU Law · Statutory interpretation: the golden rule

A statute makes it an offence to obstruct a police officer 'in the vicinity of a protected site'. Mr Reeve obstructed an officer inside the protected site. His barrister argues that the wording does not cover obstruction inside, so he should be acquitted. The judge accepts that the ordinary meaning of the words is as the barrister says but holds that this would be absurd, and reads the words as including 'in or in the vicinity of'. Which rule of interpretation has the judge applied?

1. The literal rule, because the judge has given the words their ordinary meaning without regard to the result
2. The golden rule, because the judge started from the ordinary meaning but modified it minimally to avoid an absurd result
3. The mischief rule, because the judge has looked at the previous common law and the gap in the law that Parliament meant to fill
4. The ejusdem generis rule, because general words have been confined to things of the same kind as the specific words
5. The purposive approach, because the judge has relied on the explanatory notes and ministerial statements

Show answer and explanation

Answer: B. The literal rule gives words their plain ordinary meaning even if the result is harsh. The golden rule is a modification: the court starts with the ordinary meaning but may depart from it to avoid an absurd or repugnant result. In Adler v George [1964] 2 QB 7, an offence of obstructing an officer 'in the vicinity of' a prohibited place was held to cover obstruction in the place itself, since to hold otherwise would be absurd. The judge here did the same by adding the minimum words. The mischief rule (Heydon's Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a) asks what defect in the law the Act was meant to cure. The tempting 'literal rule' answer would have meant an acquittal.

Adler v George [1964] 2 QB 7; Heydon's Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a

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Legal System, Constitutional and EU Law · Statutory interpretation: Hansard

Counsel for a client wishes to persuade a court that an ambiguous phrase in a tax statute means 'resident in the UK for the whole year'. Counsel proposes to cite the Treasury minister's statement in Parliament when the Bill was debated, which clearly supports that reading. The other side objects that Hansard cannot be used to interpret statutes. Which of the following best states the position?

1. The court may never refer to Hansard, because Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 forbids any use of parliamentary debates
2. The court may always refer to Hansard and treat any MP's speech as binding on the meaning of the Act
3. The court may consider the statement only if the legislation is ambiguous or obscure or leads to absurdity, the material is a statement by a minister or promoter, and the statement is clear
4. The court may use Hansard only if the other side agrees, because it is evidence that needs consent
5. The court may consider the statement, but only where the Act is clear, to confirm the plain meaning

Show answer and explanation

Answer: C. Before 1993 courts excluded Hansard as an aid to interpretation. In Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 the House of Lords relaxed that rule where (a) the legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or its literal meaning leads to an absurdity, (b) the material relied on consists of statements by a minister or other promoter of the Bill, and (c) the statements relied on are clear. The tax statute is ambiguous, and the Treasury minister's statement is clear, so the conditions seem to be met. Later cases, such as R (Spath Holme Ltd) v Secretary of State [2001] 2 AC 349, caution that the exception is narrow. The court is not bound to follow the statement.

Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593; Bill of Rights 1689, art 9

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Legal Services · Reserved legal activities

Estate Easy Ltd is a business run by non-lawyers. It is not authorised or regulated by any legal services regulator. It offers the following services to the public for a fee. Which of these is a reserved legal activity under the Legal Services Act 2007, so that an unauthorised person who carries it on commits an offence?

1. Drafting a will for a client and advising on the formalities for signing it.
2. Preparing a lasting power of attorney for a client who wants to appoint their son.
3. Preparing the papers on which a grant of probate is sought for an executor.
4. Advising a client on how to reduce a future inheritance tax bill.
5. Drafting a 12-month assured shorthold tenancy agreement, signed by hand and not as a deed.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: C. Section 12(1) Legal Services Act 2007 lists the reserved legal activities: the exercise of a right of audience, the conduct of litigation, reserved instrument activities, probate activities, notarial activities, and the administration of oaths. Probate activities include preparing probate papers on which a grant of probate or letters of administration is sought (Sch 2, para 6). It is an offence for a person to carry on a reserved activity unless authorised or exempt (s 14). Will writing is not reserved, which is why unregulated will writers exist. The tempting answer is the will. Many candidates assume that any document with legal effect is reserved, but the Act limits the list.

Legal Services Act 2007, s 12; Legal Services Act 2007, Sch 2; Legal Services Act 2007, s 14

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Legal Services · Legal Ombudsman

Beatrice instructed a solicitors' firm to handle the sale of her late mother's house. She complained to the firm in writing about delay and the level of the bill. Nine weeks later, she has received no final response. She is unhappy and wants to know where she can go next. Which statement is correct?

1. She must first apply to the SRA, which will decide whether the Legal Ombudsman can accept the case.
2. She must wait at least six months from her complaint before she can approach the Legal Ombudsman.
3. She can refer the complaint, and the Legal Ombudsman can strike the solicitor off the roll.
4. She can only sue the firm in court, because the Legal Ombudsman handles complaints about barristers only.
5. She can refer the complaint to the Legal Ombudsman, which can order the firm to pay compensation of up to £50,000.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: E. The Legal Ombudsman (LeO) deals with complaints about service from clients of authorised legal providers, including solicitors. A client must normally complain to the firm first. If the firm has not given a final response within eight weeks, or the client is unhappy with the response, the client may refer the complaint to LeO, within its time limits. Under s 137 Legal Services Act 2007 and the scheme rules, LeO can order apologies, corrective work, a reduction of fees and compensation up to £50,000. LeO deals with service, while the SRA deals with misconduct. The tempting answer is to go to the SRA first. That is not required and the SRA cannot award compensation.

Legal Services Act 2007, Pt 6; Legal Services Act 2007, s 137

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Legal Services · SRA Principles: priority

You are an associate. Your client, a developer, asks you to withhold from the court a document in the client's possession that clearly weakens its case on a pending application. The client says that Principle 7, acting in the client's best interests, requires you to do what it wants. You think there may be a conflict between Principle 7 and the other Principles. How do the SRA Principles 2019 deal with a conflict of this kind?

1. Principle 7 takes precedence, because the client's instructions are paramount in all circumstances.
2. All the Principles carry equal weight, so you may choose whichever you prefer.
3. Principle 7 prevails unless the client has given informed consent in writing to the breach.
4. Principles that protect the wider public interest, such as upholding the rule of law, take precedence over an individual client's interests.
5. The Principles apply only to private conduct, and the Code of Conduct governs work for clients.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: D. The SRA Principles 2019 apply to all solicitors. Principle 1 requires you to act in a way that upholds the constitutional principle of the rule of law and the proper administration of justice. Principle 2 covers public trust, and Principle 7 covers each client's best interests. The introduction states that, if there is a conflict, the Principles that safeguard the wider public interest, such as the rule of law and public confidence in the profession, take precedence over an individual client's interests. Withholding a document that you know weakens the client's case in a way that misleads the court would also breach para 1.4 of the Code. The tempting answer is that the client always comes first. That rule is limited by the Principles.

SRA Principles 2019, Principle 1; SRA Principles 2019, Principle 7; SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, para 1.4

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Legal Services · SRA Principles: conduct outside practice

Dev is a solicitor in private practice. In his own time, he applies to rent a flat. He lies on the application form, stating a salary far higher than his real earnings and giving a false reference from a friend. The landlord discovers this, but does not report it. A colleague learns of it and tells the managing partner. Dev says that this is a private matter with no connection to his clients. Can the SRA take regulatory action against him?

1. No, because the Principles apply only to work done for clients and not to personal conduct.
2. Yes, because dishonest conduct in private life can breach Principles 2, 4 and 5 and harm public trust in the profession.
3. No, unless the landlord first makes a formal complaint to the SRA.
4. Yes, but only if Dev has first been convicted of fraud in a criminal court.
5. No, because only breaches of the Code of Conduct, not the Principles, can lead to action.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: B. The SRA Principles 2019 apply to a solicitor's conduct in connection with practice and can also be engaged by behaviour in private life that undermines public trust. Principle 2 requires you to act in a way that upholds public trust and confidence in the solicitors' profession, Principle 4 requires honesty and Principle 5 integrity. Lying on a rental application is dishonest. In SRA v Wingate, the Court of Appeal held that integrity involves moral soundness and adherence to ethical standards. The SRA does not need a client complaint or a conviction. The tempting answer is that private matters are outside regulation. Serious dishonesty is likely to matter whatever its context.

SRA Principles 2019, Principle 2; SRA Principles 2019, Principle 4; SRA Principles 2019, Principle 5; SRA v Wingate [2018] EWCA Civ 366

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Legal Services · Professional conduct: reporting serious misconduct

Kiran is an associate at a firm. She sees her supervising partner, Neil, transfer £15,000 from a client's account to the firm's office account without any bill or client authority. When she asks, Neil says he will sort it out next month. Kiran believes the transfer is improper. She has not discussed it with anyone else. What does the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors require of Kiran?

1. To report the facts promptly to the SRA, which she may do through the firm's COLP or COFA, as they may be a serious breach.
2. To wait until the end of the month to see whether Neil puts the money back.
3. To raise it only with Neil and take no further step, as he is her supervisor.
4. To report only if the client complains about the transfer.
5. To say nothing, because her duty of confidentiality to the firm prevents any report.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: A. Para 7.7 of the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors requires you to report promptly to the SRA any facts or matters you reasonably believe are capable of amounting to a serious breach of the regulatory arrangements by any person regulated by the SRA. An unauthorised transfer of client money to the office account is a likely serious breach of the SRA Accounts Rules. Under para 7.12, the duty is satisfied if Kiran gives the information to the firm's COLP or COFA on the understanding that they will report it. Para 7.9 protects her from detrimental treatment for reporting. The tempting answer is to speak to Neil and wait. Neil is the person involved, and waiting fails the "promptly" requirement.

SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, para 7.7; SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, para 7.12; SRA Accounts Rules, rule 5.1

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Legal Services · Professional conduct: errors and claims

You are a solicitor acting for Ola in a personal injury claim. You realise that you diarised the limitation date wrongly and the claim form was issued two days after limitation expired. The defendant has not yet raised the point. You think there may be grounds to ask the court to disapply the limitation period, but success is uncertain. You are worried about the firm's reputation. What should you do about telling Ola?

1. Wait until the defendant raises limitation, in case the problem never appears.
2. Tell Ola only if the court refuses to disapply the limitation period.
3. Tell Ola promptly that an error may give rise to a claim against the firm, and say she may wish to take independent advice.
4. Say nothing to Ola but report the error to the firm's insurers.
5. Offer Ola a discount on her fees and ask her to agree not to complain.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: C. Para 7.11 of the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors requires you to be honest and open with clients if things go wrong, and to explain fully and promptly what has happened and the likely impact. Issuing after the limitation date is such an error, and it could give rise to a claim by Ola against the firm. Principle 7 requires you to act in Ola's best interests, and para 1.4 prevents you from misleading her by silence. The firm now has an interest of its own in the outcome, so there is a potential own-interest conflict (para 6.1). Ola should be told that she may wish to take independent advice. You must also follow the firm's procedure, including telling the COLP and the insurers. The tempting answer is to wait for the defendant. The Code requires prompt openness.

SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, para 7.11; SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, para 6.1; SRA Principles 2019, Principle 7

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Property Law and Practice · Contract: risk between exchange and completion

Ben Okoye has exchanged contracts to buy a detached house in Leeds for £340,000. The contract incorporates the Standard Conditions of Sale without amendment, and completion is set for four weeks after exchange. Ten days after exchange, a storm drops a tree on the roof and the house cannot be lived in. The seller's buildings insurance had lapsed. Ben has not arranged any insurance of his own. Which of the following best describes Ben's position?

1. The seller keeps the risk until completion, so Ben may rescind the contract because the house is now unusable for its purpose.
2. The contract is frustrated by the damage, so it ends automatically and neither party has any claim against the other.
3. Ben must complete, but at a price reduced by the cost of repair, because the seller let its insurance lapse.
4. Ben must complete, but he may claim the cost of repair from the seller, who had a duty to keep the house insured.
5. Ben carries the risk from exchange, so he must complete at the full price and bear the loss himself.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: A. Under an open contract the risk passes to the buyer on exchange (Paine v Meller). The Standard Conditions of Sale reverse this: the seller must transfer the property in the same physical state as at the date of the contract, apart from fair wear and tear, so the seller keeps the risk until completion. If, before completion, the physical state of the property makes it unusable for its purpose at the date of the contract, the buyer may rescind. A house that cannot be lived in is unusable for its purpose, so Ben may rescind and recover his deposit. The lapse of the seller's insurance does not change Ben's rights; it is the seller's problem. The tempting wrong answer applies the open contract rule, which the Standard Conditions displace. Contrast the Standard Commercial Property Conditions, under which the buyer bears the risk from exchange.

Standard Conditions of Sale (5th edition, 2018 revision), condition 7.1 (risk and responsibility for the property); Paine v Meller (1801) 6 Ves 349

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Property Law and Practice · Investigating title: registered charge

Priya Nair is buying a flat in Reading for £285,000 with the help of a mortgage. The copies of the register show Mr Doyle as registered proprietor with absolute title. The charges register contains a registered charge in favour of a bank. Mr Doyle's solicitor says that the mortgage will be repaid from the sale proceeds. Priya's solicitor must decide how to deal with the charge. What is the best course of action?

1. Accept the seller's solicitor's undertaking to redeem the charge on completion and to supply evidence of its discharge for registration.
2. Insist that the charge is removed from the register before exchange, because Priya cannot otherwise be bound to complete.
3. Take no action, because on registration of her transfer for value Priya takes free of every earlier registered charge.
4. Ask the bank to approve the sale in writing, because a registered chargee must always consent to a transfer by the proprietor.
5. Complete without any undertaking and keep part of the price until the Land Registry has removed the charge from the register.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: A. A registered charge is an interest entered on the register, so a buyer for value takes subject to it (Land Registration Act 2002, s 29(2)(a)(i)). The usual and safe practice is to complete with the seller's solicitor undertaking to redeem the loan from the proceeds, and to send evidence of discharge so that the buyer's solicitor can have the charge removed. The charge does not need to be cleared before exchange, and the sale can be contracted subject to its removal on completion. The tempting view that the buyer takes free of the charge is wrong because section 29 protects registered charges rather than extinguishing them. A lender has no right of veto unless a restriction is on the register.

Land Registration Act 2002, s 29(2)(a)(i); Law Society Code for Completion by Post (2019)

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Property Law and Practice · Investigating title: unregistered land

Mr Hughes is selling an unregistered freehold field in Shropshire to a developer. The contract is an open contract. Mr Hughes has these documents: a conveyance on sale dated 1971; a conveyance on sale dated 1994 to his late father; and an assent in his own favour dated 2018. The land has never been registered. The developer's solicitor wants to know which document will serve as the root of title. Which of the following is correct?

1. The 2018 assent, because it is the most recent document and it vests the legal estate in the seller.
2. The 1971 conveyance, because the seller must prove title for at least 40 years before the contract.
3. The 1994 conveyance, but only if the developer first agrees that title may start with a document under 30 years old.
4. No root of title is needed, because the land will be registered at the Land Registry on completion.
5. The 1994 conveyance on sale, because it is the most recent suitable document that is at least 15 years old.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: E. Under the Law of Property Act 1925, s 44(1), as amended by the Law of Property Act 1969, s 23, an open contract requires the seller to show a good root of title at least 15 years old. A conveyance on sale that deals with the whole legal and equitable interest, describes the land and casts no doubt on title is a good root. The 1994 conveyance meets this and is the most recent document that is old enough. The 2018 assent is under 15 years old. The 1971 conveyance would also be valid, but the old 40 year rule no longer applies, and the seller need not go back that far. First registration after completion does not remove the need to show title.

Law of Property Act 1925, s 44(1); Law of Property Act 1969, s 23

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Property Law and Practice · First registration: failure to register

Anita Joshi bought unregistered freehold land in Kent by a conveyance on sale and completed on 3 March. Her solicitor was told to register the title but did nothing. On 20 June, Anita's new solicitor discovers that no application has been made. The land is in an area of compulsory registration. What is the legal effect of the delay?

1. The conveyance is void, so Anita can recover her purchase money from the seller as money paid for a failed consideration.
2. The legal estate stays with Anita, and the Registrar must accept a late application without any further steps.
3. Anita keeps the legal estate but loses priority to any person who later registers an interest in the land.
4. The title is registered automatically from the date of completion, but the Registrar may fine Anita for the delay.
5. The legal estate reverts to the seller, who holds it on a bare trust for Anita, and Anita holds only an equitable interest.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: E. On a conveyance on sale of unregistered freehold land, the buyer must apply for first registration within two months of the date of the disposition (Land Registration Act 2002, ss 4 and 6(4)). If no application is made in time, the transfer becomes void as regards the transfer of the legal estate (s 7(1)). Under s 7(2)(a), title to the legal estate reverts to the seller, who holds it on a bare trust for the buyer. Anita therefore holds only an equitable interest. The sale itself is not undone, so she cannot recover the price. The usual cure is to apply to the registrar to extend the period under s 6(5), giving a good reason for the delay, or else to obtain a fresh conveyance from the seller at Anita's expense (s 8).

Land Registration Act 2002, ss 4, 6, 7 and 8

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Property Law and Practice · Stamp Duty Land Tax: first-time buyers' relief

Karim and Laila are first-time buyers purchasing their first home in Manchester for £450,000 in England. Assume these rates. Standard residential SDLT: nil up to £125,000; 2% on the part from £125,001 to £250,000; 5% on the part from £250,001 to £925,000. First-time buyers' relief: nil on the first £300,000 and 5% on the part from £300,001 to £500,000, with no relief at all if the price exceeds £500,000. How much SDLT is payable?

1. £2,500
2. £7,500
3. £10,000
4. £12,500
5. £22,500

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Answer: B. First-time buyers' relief is available because the price does not exceed £500,000 and both buyers are first-time buyers (Finance Act 2003, Sch 6ZA). Using the rates given, the first £300,000 is taxed at nil. The remaining £150,000 (from £300,001 to £450,000) is taxed at 5%, which is £7,500. The figure of £12,500 is what the buyers would pay without the relief: £2,500 on the 2% band plus £10,000 on the 5% band from £250,001 to £450,000. £22,500 would result from applying 5% to the whole price, which is not how SDLT works. SDLT is a slice tax, charged band by band.

Finance Act 2003, s 55 and Sch 6ZA

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Property Law and Practice · Conflict of interest: acting for buyer and lender

Rosa Delgado acts for Dev Kapoor on the purchase of a flat for £260,000 and for his lender under the lender's standard instructions. The contract states the price as £260,000. Dev tells Rosa that the seller will give him £20,000 in cash after completion as a private deal. He asks Rosa not to mention it to the lender. Which of the following is the correct course for Rosa?

1. Keep Dev's confidence under her duty of confidentiality and continue to act for both him and the lender.
2. Explain that she must tell the lender, and if Dev will not agree, stop acting for both of them.
3. Tell the lender at once without speaking to Dev, because her duty to the lender overrides everything else.
4. Stop acting for the lender but carry on for Dev, because the lender can simply instruct another firm.
5. Continue for both, but ask Dev to sign a note confirming that he takes responsibility for the omission.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: B. A lender client is entitled to know material facts affecting the loan, and a cash-back of this kind is material. The solicitor must make clients aware of all information material to the matter (SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, para 6.4). Confidentiality (para 6.3) does not allow her to hide it from a client for whom she acts. If Dev will not allow disclosure, Rosa has a conflict between two clients with no common interest (para 6.2) and must stop acting for both, and she must not mislead anyone (para 1.4). She should first explain the position to Dev. Dropping only the lender would help Dev to conceal the cash-back from the lender and could assist mortgage fraud.

SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, paras 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 1.4; SRA Principles 2019, Principle 5

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Wills and the Administration of Estates · Validity and formalities

Ruth Okafor, a retired teacher, signs her will in the living room in front of two friends, Dev and Helen, who are both present at the same time. Ruth then leaves for a hospital appointment. Dev and Helen take the will into the hallway, out of Ruth's sight, and sign it there as witnesses. Ruth dies the following year. Which statement best describes the validity of the will?

1. The will is valid because both witnesses saw Ruth sign and then signed before she died.
2. The will is valid because section 9 only requires the witnesses to sign in the presence of each other.
3. The will is invalid because each witness must attest and sign, or acknowledge a signature, in the presence of the testator.
4. The will is invalid because the witnesses must sign the will before the testator signs it.
5. The will is valid if Dev and Helen later confirm that Ruth intended the document to be her will.

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Answer: C. Section 9 of the Wills Act 1837 requires the will to be in writing and signed by the testator. The signature must be made or acknowledged in the presence of two witnesses present at the same time. Each witness must then attest and sign, or acknowledge a signature, in the presence of the testator. The witnesses do not have to sign in each other's presence. Here Dev and Helen signed out of Ruth's sight, so the last requirement is not met and the will is not validly executed. Later confirmation of Ruth's intention cannot cure the defect, because the formalities are mandatory.

Wills Act 1837, s 9

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Wills and the Administration of Estates · Testamentary capacity

In March, Hamid Siddiqui, aged 81, gave clear instructions to his solicitor for a will leaving his estate equally to his three children. The solicitor prepared the will in those terms. In April, Hamid's dementia worsened. When the will was brought to him, he said 'this is what I asked for' and signed it with two witnesses. Medical evidence suggests he could not have understood the full will at the time of signing. Which statement best describes the validity of the will?

1. The will is invalid because Hamid must have full capacity at the moment of signing.
2. The will may be valid if Hamid had capacity when giving instructions and at signing knew he was executing a will carrying them out.
3. The will is valid because a properly executed will is conclusive evidence of capacity.
4. The will is invalid unless a doctor witnessed the signing.
5. The will is valid because capacity is judged only at the date the instructions are taken, whatever his later state.

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Answer: B. Capacity is judged by the Banks v Goodfellow test. Where a testator has capacity when giving instructions, the will is prepared in accordance with them, and at execution the testator remembers giving instructions and believes the will carries them out, the will is valid even if he can no longer understand its detail. That is the rule in Parker v Felgate. Hamid's words 'this is what I asked for' support that. The tempting answer is that capacity is always needed at signing, but the Parker v Felgate rule relaxes this. His state at signing still matters, so the date of instructions alone is not enough.

Parker v Felgate (1883) 8 PD 171; Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549

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Wills and the Administration of Estates · Knowledge and approval

Mrs Vance, aged 85, is a long-standing client of your firm. She tells the partner, Mr Lewis, that she wants to change her will to leave him £80,000 'because you have been so kind to me for years'. Mr Lewis would normally draft the will. Under the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, what should Mr Lewis do?

1. Decline to act and recommend that she instructs another firm, because he has a personal interest in the will.
2. Act, provided Mrs Vance gives her informed consent in writing to his interest.
3. Act, provided a colleague in the same firm supervises the work and signs a file note.
4. Act, but reduce the gift to a modest sum so the conflict becomes acceptable.
5. Act, after asking Mrs Vance's family to confirm that she has capacity and is not under pressure.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: A. Paragraph 6.1 of the Code says you do not act if you have a conflict of interest with your client. A substantial gift to the drafting solicitor is a personal interest. The exceptions based on informed written consent in para 6.2 apply only to conflicts between clients, not to conflicts between solicitor and client. A substantial gift to the draftsman also raises suspicion, so the will could be challenged on knowledge and approval. Mr Lewis should decline and suggest another firm. Supervision by a colleague in the same firm does not remove the conflict.

SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, para 6.1; Wintle v Nye [1959] 1 WLR 284

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Wills and the Administration of Estates · Undue influence and duress

Maria Rossi, aged 79, lived with her daughter Eliza, who cared for her. Eliza regularly told Maria that she had given up her career to care for her and that the house should be hers. After months of this, Maria changed her will to leave the house to Eliza rather than to her three children equally. Maria's son Luis says the will was made under undue influence. Which statement best describes the law?

1. Because Eliza was Maria's carer, a presumption of undue influence arises and Eliza must disprove it.
2. The will is invalid because Eliza's repeated requests influenced Maria's decision.
3. Luis must prove that the pressure overbore Maria's own judgment; persuasion or appeals to gratitude alone are not enough.
4. The will is invalid unless Maria received independent legal advice before signing.
5. The will is valid whatever Eliza did, because only the formalities in section 9 matter.

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Answer: C. For a will, undue influence means coercion that overbears the testator's free will so the will is the wishes of the influencer. There is no presumption of undue influence in wills, even for a carer or relative, so the burden is on the person alleging it (Hall v Hall; Wingrove v Wingrove). Persuasion, appeals to affection or gratitude and even importunity that stops short of coercion are not undue influence. Repeated pressure can amount to undue influence, but only if it overbore Maria's judgment, and Luis would have to prove that. The presumption that applies to some lifetime gifts does not apply to wills.

Hall v Hall (1868) LR 1 P&D 481; Wingrove v Wingrove (1885) 11 PD 81

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Wills and the Administration of Estates · Rectification and construction

Hana Petrov instructed a firm to include a gift of £10,000 to her niece Ella. By a typing error the will, which Hana signed correctly, reads '£1,000'. Hana died. A grant of probate was issued two months ago. Ella wants the figure corrected. Which statement best describes the position?

1. The court has no power to alter the words of a will after the testator has died.
2. The only remedy is a claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.
3. The court can rectify only if every other beneficiary consents in writing.
4. The court can rectify a clerical error, and an application should normally be made within six months of the grant.
5. The court can rectify only if the application is made within twelve months of Hana's death.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: D. Section 20 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 allows the court to rectify a will to carry out the testator's intentions if the will fails to do so because of a clerical error or a failure to understand instructions. Here a typing error is a clerical error. Section 20(2) says an application should not be made after six months from the date of the grant, without the court's permission. Ella's application is in time. The consent of other beneficiaries is not needed, though they may be joined as parties. Evidence such as the attendance note and drafts would be used.

Administration of Justice Act 1982, s 20

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Wills and the Administration of Estates · Revocation by marriage

In 2019 Nadia Karim made a valid will leaving her whole estate to her sister. The will does not mention marriage. In 2025 Nadia, who has no children, married Samir. She did not make a new will. Nadia has now died with an estate worth £250,000. Samir survived her by more than 28 days. Which statement best describes the effect of the marriage on the will?

1. The will remains valid because marriage revokes only gifts made to a former spouse.
2. The will was revoked by the marriage, and the estate passes to Samir under the intestacy rules.
3. The will was revoked only as to the gift to the sister, and Samir takes under the intestacy rules.
4. The will remains valid, but Samir can ask the court to cancel it as of right.
5. The will was revoked only if Nadia told her solicitor about the marriage.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: B. Section 18(1) of the Wills Act 1837 provides that a will is revoked by the testator's marriage or civil partnership, unless an exception applies. Nadia's will does not show that it was made in expectation of marrying Samir, so the exception in s 18(3) does not apply. The whole will is revoked and Nadia died intestate. With a spouse and no issue, Samir takes the whole estate under s 46 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925, as amended. The tempting option that only the gift to the sister fails is wrong, because revocation affects the whole will.

Wills Act 1837, s 18; Administration of Estates Act 1925, s 46

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Solicitors Accounts · Client money: stakeholder deposit

The firm acts for Mr and Mrs Roy in the sale of their house. Contracts are exchanged and the buyer's solicitor pays the 10% deposit of £30,000 to the firm. The contract provides that the firm holds the deposit as stakeholder until completion. A trainee asks whether the £30,000 is client money and where it should be held. What is the correct answer?

1. It is client money because it is held on behalf of a third party as stakeholder, so it goes promptly into a client account.
2. It is not client money until completion, so it may be held in the business account until the transfer is made.
3. It is client money only if the Roys give written instructions, so it stays in the business account until then.
4. It is client money, but the firm may keep it in the business account if the buyer's solicitor agrees to that.
5. It is client money only after the Roys have received the proceeds, and until then it belongs to the buyer.

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Answer: A. Under the SRA Accounts Rules, rule 2.1, client money includes money held or received on behalf of a third party, such as money held as agent, stakeholder or to the sender's order. Money held as stakeholder is therefore client money, even though it does not yet belong to the Roys. Rule 2.3 requires client money to be paid promptly into a client account, and rule 4.1 requires it to be kept separate from the firm's own money. The money must stay in the client account until completion, when it is released under the contract. The tempting answer is that the money is not client money until it is released, but rule 2.1(b) refers to money held on behalf of a third party, which covers it from receipt.

SRA Accounts Rules, rules 2.1, 2.3 and 4.1

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Solicitors Accounts · Client money: unpaid disbursements

Kemi Adeyinka is buying a flat through the firm. Before any bill has been sent, she pays £850 on account towards the search fees, Land Registry fee and other expenses that the firm will pay for her. The firm's cashier suggests paying the £850 into the business account, because the firm will use it to pay these costs and because the firm is entitled to payment of its own disbursements. How should the money be treated?

1. As business money, since the firm is liable to the search providers and the payment is for the firm's own costs.
2. As business money until the first search fee is paid, and then as client money for the rest.
3. As client money, because money held for unpaid disbursements before a bill is delivered is client money.
4. As client money only if Kemi has told the firm in writing that it is to be held in a client account.
5. As business money, since disbursements are never client money once the client has paid them to the firm.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: C. Rule 2.1(d) of the SRA Accounts Rules defines client money to include money held or received in respect of the firm's fees and unpaid disbursements if it is held or received before a bill for them is delivered. Kemi's £850 was paid before any bill, so it is client money. It must be paid promptly into a client account (rule 2.3) and used only for the purpose for which it is held (rule 5.1). Rule 2.2 allows such money to be kept in the business account only where it is the only client money the firm holds, the disbursements are ones the firm is liable for, and the client has been told in advance where and how the money will be held. This firm runs a client account for conveyancing clients, so that exception does not apply. The firm's liability to the suppliers does not make the money the firm's own.

SRA Accounts Rules, rules 2.1(d), 2.2, 2.3 and 5.1

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Solicitors Accounts · Business money: payment of a delivered bill

On Monday the firm sent Mr Grant a bill for £1,800, made up of £1,500 profit costs and £300 VAT, for work on the completed sale of his house. On Thursday, he pays the bill in full by bank transfer. There are no other sums for him or his matter. The firm's accounts clerk asks whether the £1,800 can be paid into the business account. What is the correct answer?

1. Yes, because the payment settles a bill already delivered and so it is not client money.
2. No, because every payment received from a client is client money until the file is closed.
3. No, because the payment must first go into the client account and then be transferred after seven days.
4. Yes, but only after the firm has obtained a written authority from Mr Grant to bank the money.
5. No, because VAT charged on a bill is always client money until it is paid over to HMRC.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: A. Rule 2.1(d) makes money for fees and unpaid disbursements client money only if it is held or received before a bill is delivered. Once the bill has been delivered, a payment of that bill is the firm's own money, not client money. Mr Grant paid after delivery, so the £1,800 is business money and should go into the business account. Paying it into the client account would breach rule 4.1 (client money must be kept separate from the firm's money) unless corrected promptly. There is no seven-day period, and no authority is needed to bank the firm's own fees. The VAT is part of the bill and, once paid, is the firm's money, to be accounted for to HMRC in the usual way as part of the firm's VAT return.

SRA Accounts Rules, rules 2.1(d) and 4.1

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Solicitors Accounts · Mixed payments

Dr Okonkwo sends the firm one cheque for £14,000. It is made up of £2,400 to pay a bill the firm delivered last month for a completed matter, and £11,600 that he wants held as a deposit for a house he is buying through the firm. The cheque cannot be split. What does the SRA Accounts Rules, rule 4.2, require the firm to do?

1. Pay the cheque into the business account, since the firm is owed part of it, and keep all of it until completion.
2. Hold the whole £14,000 as client money until the purchase completes, even though £2,400 is the firm's fee.
3. Pay the cheque into the client account, since most of it is client money, and leave the £2,400 there as a cushion.
4. Return the cheque to Dr Okonkwo, because the firm may not accept a payment that is partly client money.
5. Allocate the money promptly so that £11,600 is held as client money and £2,400 is moved to the business account.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: E. A mixed payment is a payment that includes both client money and other money. Rule 4.2 requires the firm to ensure that funds from mixed payments are allocated promptly to the correct client account or business account. Here £11,600 is client money (a deposit held for the client) and £2,400 is the firm's money (payment of a delivered bill). The firm should allocate them promptly, so that the client's deposit is protected and the fee is not left in the client account. Leaving the firm's £2,400 in the client account would breach the rule that client money must be kept separate (rule 4.1). A mixed payment is not forbidden, and the firm need not return the cheque.

SRA Accounts Rules, rules 4.1 and 4.2

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Solicitors Accounts · Banking facilities

A long-standing client, Mr Zahid, asks the firm to receive £120,000 from his business partner into the firm's client account and, two days later, to pay the money to a supplier in another country. He says there is no property transaction or other legal work, and he will pay the firm a £500 fee for helping. The fee earner thinks the request is harmless, since the money will be in the client account for only two days. What should the fee earner do?

1. Accept, because the money will be held only briefly and Mr Zahid will pay a fee.
2. Accept, because Mr Zahid has given clear written instructions and the firm has acted for him before.
3. Accept, but only if the partner who supervises the matter has approved the transfer in writing.
4. Decline, but only if the sum exceeds the limit the firm sets for payments through its client account.
5. Decline, because the client account must not be used to provide banking facilities, and the request is a money laundering warning sign.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: E. Rule 3.3 of the SRA Accounts Rules says that a firm must not use a client account to provide banking facilities to clients or third parties. Payments into and out of the account must be in respect of regulated services the firm is delivering. Here there is no underlying legal work, so the firm would be acting as a bank. Duration, a fee and the client's instructions do not change this. The request is also a classic money laundering red flag, since funds move through the account with no legal purpose, and the firm must consider whether to make an internal report. The firm must also safeguard money entrusted to it (SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, para 4.2), and passing it on to a third party without a legitimate purpose would risk breaching it.

SRA Accounts Rules, rule 3.3; SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, para 4.2

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Solicitors Accounts · Transfers from client account to pay costs

The firm acted for Mrs Patel on the sale of her house, and holds £7,000 of her proceeds in the client account. The supervising partner's unbilled costs are about £2,500. The partner tells the cashier to transfer £2,500 to the business account today, to help the firm's cash flow, and says the bill will be sent after the month-end. The matter is complete and Mrs Patel is happy with the service. May the transfer be made?

1. Yes, because the matter is complete and the firm is clearly owed its costs.
2. Yes, because the transfer is recorded in the client ledger and the cash book.
3. Yes, if Mrs Patel agrees verbally by telephone and a note of the call is made.
4. No, because a bill of costs or other written notification of costs must be given before client money is used to pay costs.
5. No, because costs may be paid from client money only once the client has paid them to the firm by cheque.

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Answer: D. Under rule 4.3 of the SRA Accounts Rules, before the firm uses client money to pay its costs, it must give the client a bill of costs or other written notification of the costs, and the transfer must be for the specific sum identified. The partner proposes to move £2,500 first and send the bill later, which reverses the order required. The firm also needs to be able to show that the amount held covers the transfer. The firm's cash flow needs or the client's goodwill do not change this. Recording the transfer in the ledgers is required (rule 8.1), but it does not make an otherwise improper transfer permissible. An oral agreement is not a written notification.

SRA Accounts Rules, rules 4.3 and 8.1

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Land Law · Legal estates and interests

Priya is advising a family trust company on a portfolio of interests in land in Leeds. Each interest was created recently. The company asks which of them is capable of existing as a legal estate under the Law of Property Act 1925, rather than only in equity. Which of the following interests is capable of being a legal estate?

1. A life interest in a house, given to the settlor's brother.
2. A freehold interest that takes effect only after the death of a present life tenant.
3. A leasehold interest granted for 99 years at a premium, with a fixed start date.
4. A fee tail granted to the settlor's eldest grandchild.
5. A freehold interest in a flat that is to end if the owner marries.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: C. Since 1925 only two estates can be legal: the fee simple absolute in possession and the term of years absolute (LPA 1925, s 1(1)). A lease for 99 years with a fixed start date is a term of years absolute, so it can be legal if created with the right formalities. The life interest and the fee simple in remainder cannot be legal estates. A fee tail cannot even be created now: since 1997 an attempt to grant one takes effect as a trust of the land (Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, Sch 1, para 5). The freehold that ends on marriage is a determinable fee, which is not 'absolute'. The tempting wrong answer is the remainder interest: it is a freehold, but it is not 'in possession', so it can only take effect in equity.

Law of Property Act 1925, s 1(1); Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, Sch 1, para 5

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Land Law · Formalities for leases

Dev owns a shop in Bolton. He agrees with Mara that she may occupy it for two years at the best rent reasonably obtainable, with no premium, starting next week. They shake hands but sign nothing. Dev's solicitor is asked whether Mara will have a legal lease. The land is unregistered. Which of the following is correct?

1. Mara has a legal lease, because a lease of three years or less at the best rent without a premium, taking effect in possession, may be created orally.
2. Mara has only an equitable lease, because every lease must be made by deed to be legal.
3. Mara has only a licence, because a lease cannot exist without a written agreement.
4. Mara has no interest in the land, because the agreement fails for lack of writing under section 2 of the 1989 Act.
5. Mara has a legal lease only once it is registered at HM Land Registry.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: A. A legal lease must normally be made by deed (LPA 1925, s 52(1)). There is an exception. A lease for three years or less, taking effect in possession, at the best rent reasonably obtainable without a fine, may be created orally or in writing (ss 52(2)(d) and 54(2)). Dev and Mara's lease fits all those conditions: two years, immediate possession, best rent, no premium. So it is a legal lease. The tempting wrong answer is that a deed is always needed. That is true only for leases outside the s 54(2) exception.

Law of Property Act 1925, ss 52(1), 52(2)(d), 54(2)

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Land Law · Registration of title

Hamza owns the unregistered freehold of a house in Cardiff and has never registered it. His solicitor explains that some dealings with unregistered land trigger compulsory first registration under the Land Registration Act 2002, and that a failure to register leads to legal consequences. Hamza wants to know which of the following dealings would trigger compulsory first registration. Which one would?

1. The exchange of contracts for the sale of the freehold, before completion.
2. The grant of a lease of exactly seven years, by deed, to a tenant.
3. The grant of a legal easement over the freehold, by deed, to a neighbour.
4. The grant to a tenant of a lease for a term of 15 years, taking effect in possession.
5. The assignment of an existing lease that has only five years left to run.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: D. Compulsory first registration is triggered by listed events. They include a transfer of the freehold on sale or by gift, the grant of a lease of more than seven years, and the assignment of a lease with more than seven years left to run (LRA 2002, s 4(1)). A 15 year lease is therefore a trigger. A contract is not, and a lease of exactly seven years is not. The tempting wrong answer is the seven year lease: the test is 'more than seven years', so exactly seven years falls just outside it.

Land Registration Act 2002, s 4(1)

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Land Law · Registered land: unregistered registrable disposition

Ruth is the registered proprietor of a shop in Hull. Three years ago she granted Tom a ten year lease by deed. Tom took possession, pays rent and runs his business there. The lease was never registered at HM Land Registry. Ruth has now sold her freehold to Zed, who is registered as the new proprietor. The register shows no mention of Tom. Tom's solicitor asks whether Zed is bound by Tom's lease. Which of the following is correct?

1. Zed is bound: the lease is a legal lease, because it was made by deed and Tom took possession.
2. Zed is not bound: an unregistered lease of more than seven years cannot affect a registered buyer for value.
3. Zed is bound only if Zed had actual notice of the lease before completion.
4. Zed is bound because a lease of any length overrides a registered disposition.
5. Zed is bound: the lease takes effect in equity only, but Tom's actual occupation makes it an overriding interest.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: E. A lease of more than seven years is a registrable disposition. Until it is registered it does not take effect at law (LRA 2002, s 27(2)(b)). Tom therefore has an equitable lease, enforceable under Walsh v Lonsdale. A registered disponee for value takes free of unprotected equitable interests (s 29). But an interest of a person in actual occupation overrides unless an exception applies (Sch 3, para 2). Tom is in actual occupation, so his interest binds Zed. The tempting wrong answer is that Zed takes free because the lease is unregistered: that forgets the overriding interest route.

Land Registration Act 2002, ss 27(2)(b), 29; Land Registration Act 2002, Sch 3, para 2

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Land Law · Contracts for the sale of land

Olu orally agrees with his neighbour Karen that he will buy her registered garden plot for 40,000 pounds. The deposit of 4,000 pounds is paid by bank transfer. Olu then spends a further 6,000 pounds clearing the plot, relying on Karen's repeated promises to sign a contract. Karen now refuses to sell. No document has been signed by either of them. Olu wants to enforce the sale. Which of the following best states Olu's position?

1. There is a valid contract, because the deposit was paid and Olu acted in part performance.
2. There is no valid contract under s 2 of the 1989 Act, although Olu may have other claims, such as recovery of the deposit or proprietary estoppel.
3. There is a valid contract, because an oral contract for land is enforceable once money is paid under it.
4. There is no contract and Olu has no claim at all, because s 2 of the 1989 Act makes the transaction void for every purpose.
5. There is a valid contract, but only an order for damages is available, not specific performance.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: B. A contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land can be made only in writing. It must incorporate all the terms the parties expressly agreed, and be signed by or for each party (Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s 2(1) and (3)). Olu and Karen have signed nothing, so there is no contract, and part performance is no longer a route to enforcement. Section 2(5) saves resulting, implied and constructive trusts. Olu can seek return of the deposit, and may argue proprietary estoppel or a constructive trust (Yaxley v Gotts), although estoppel is hard where both sides knew a formal contract was still needed (Cobbe v Yeoman's Row). The tempting wrong answer is that payment makes the oral deal binding. It does not.

Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s 2(1), (3), (5); Yaxley v Gotts [2000] Ch 162

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Land Law · Overriding interests: actual occupation

Mr Rana is the sole registered proprietor of the family home in Leicester. His wife, Mrs Rana, paid half of the purchase price and lives in the house, so she has a beneficial interest under a trust. She has never registered anything. Without telling her, Mr Rana grants a charge over the house to Northgate Bank to secure a business loan. Her clothes and car are plainly there. The bank did not inspect or ask who lived there. When the loan defaults, the bank seeks possession. Which of the following is correct?

1. The bank takes free of her interest, because she did not protect it by a restriction.
2. The bank takes free of her interest, because it was overreached when the loan money was paid to Mr Rana.
3. The bank takes subject to Mrs Rana's beneficial interest, because it is an interest of a person in actual occupation and overreaching did not occur.
4. The bank takes free of her interest, because only a legal estate can override a registered charge.
5. The bank takes subject to her interest only if the bank had actual knowledge of her at completion.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: C. A beneficial interest under a trust of land is an interest in land. It binds a registered chargee if the beneficiary was in actual occupation at the time of the disposition (LRA 2002, ss 29(2)(a)(ii) and 30; Sch 3, para 2; Williams & Glyn's Bank v Boland). The exceptions do not apply: she was not asked, and her occupation was obvious. Overreaching needs capital money paid to two trustees or a trust corporation (LPA 1925, ss 2 and 27), and here there was only one. The tempting wrong answer is that a restriction was needed. A restriction gives protection, but actual occupation is a separate route.

Land Registration Act 2002, ss 29, 30; Sch 3, para 2; Law of Property Act 1925, s 2(1)(ii)

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Trusts Law · Certainty of intention

Walter's will leaves his residuary estate to his widow Edith 'absolutely, in the full confidence that she will make such provision for our children as she thinks right'. Edith takes the estate and gives nothing to the children. The children's solicitor asks whether Walter created a trust of the estate for them. The will contains no other relevant words. Which of the following is the best analysis?

1. No trust arose, because the words are precatory and show only a hope, not an intention to impose a binding obligation on Edith.
2. A trust arose, because 'confidence' is the word that creates a trust in a will.
3. A trust arose, because the children are Walter's natural beneficiaries.
4. A trust arose, because the word 'absolutely' is followed by words of obligation.
5. No trust arose, because a will cannot create a trust of residue.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: A. A trust requires three certainties: intention, subject matter and objects (Knight v Knight). The settlor must intend to impose a binding obligation, but need not use the word 'trust'. Courts no longer treat words such as 'in full confidence' as creating a trust. They look at the whole document and the surrounding circumstances (Re Adams and the Kensington Vestry). Walter gave the estate to Edith absolutely and expressed only a hope about the children. That is a precatory expression and does not show intention to create a trust. The tempting wrong answer is that 'confidence' creates a trust. That was the old approach, which the courts have abandoned.

Re Adams and the Kensington Vestry (1884) 27 Ch D 394; Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148

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Trusts Law · Certainty of subject matter

Gloria writes to her niece Lisa: 'I hold the bulk of the money in my savings account on trust for you.' The account holds about 90,000 pounds. Gloria never says what proportion 'the bulk' means. Gloria later dies and her executors refuse to pay Lisa anything. Lisa's solicitor asks whether the trust is valid. Which of the following is correct?

1. The trust is valid, because the account is identified and Lisa is certain.
2. The trust is valid for 51 per cent of the account, because 'the bulk' means more than half.
3. The trust is valid, but the court will fix the share that is fair.
4. The trust fails for uncertainty of subject matter, because 'the bulk' does not identify what Lisa is to receive.
5. The trust fails for want of writing, because savings must be settled by deed.

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Answer: D. For a valid express trust, the settlor must show certainty of intention, of subject matter and of objects. The trust property, and the interest each beneficiary takes, must be certain. In Palmer v Simmonds, a gift of 'the bulk' of the residue was void for uncertainty. Gloria's gift of 'the bulk' of her savings leaves it unclear how much Lisa is to take, so the trust fails and the money stays with Gloria's estate. The tempting wrong answer is that the trust is valid because Lisa and the account are clear. Both are clear, but the beneficial interest is not.

Palmer v Simmonds (1854) 2 Drew 221; Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148

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Trusts Law · Certainty of objects: discretionary trusts

The trustees of a fund hold 400,000 pounds on discretionary trust 'for such of the employees and former employees of Harlow Engineering Ltd and their dependants as the trustees think fit'. The company has several hundred current and former staff, and the trustees cannot produce a complete list of everyone who qualifies. A former employee asks whether the trust is void for uncertainty of objects. Which of the following is correct?

1. The trust is void unless the trustees can draw up a complete list of every possible object.
2. The trust is valid if the trustees can say of any given person whether or not that person is within the class.
3. The trust is void, because a class including dependants is too large to be certain.
4. The trust is void unless the court first appoints one beneficiary with an absolute right.
5. The trust is valid only if the trustees can show that each person's share is equal.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: B. For a fixed trust, all the beneficiaries must be ascertainable (the 'complete list' test; IRC v Broadway Cottages). For a discretionary trust, the test is whether it can be said with certainty of any given person that they are or are not a member of the class (McPhail v Doulton; Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No 2)). The class of employees, former employees and dependants is conceptually clear, and a court could decide on evidence. A class is void for administrative unworkability only if it is so hopelessly wide as to be incapable of forming a class. The tempting wrong answer is the complete list test. It belongs to fixed trusts.

McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424; Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No 2) [1973] Ch 9

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Trusts Law · Non-charitable purpose trusts

Edmund's will leaves 100,000 pounds to trustees on trust 'to promote friendship between the Carver family and the Dunn family'. The two families, who live in different towns, have about 70 living members between them. The trustees are willing to act. The Carver family's solicitor asks whether the trust is valid. Which of the following is correct?

1. The trust is valid, because the trustees are willing to carry out the purpose.
2. The trust is valid, because promoting friendship is a charitable purpose.
3. The trust is valid for 21 years, because purpose trusts are always allowed for that time.
4. The trust is valid, because it is a gift to the 70 family members, who can each sue.
5. The trust is void, because it is a non-charitable purpose trust with no beneficiary who can enforce it.

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Answer: E. A trust must have a beneficiary who can enforce it against the trustees (Morice v Bishop of Durham). A trust for a non-charitable purpose is void, apart from recognised anomalous exceptions such as trusts for particular animals, graves or tombs (Re Endacott). Promoting friendship between two families is not charitable, because it is private and not for public benefit. It is also not a trust for the family members themselves (contrast Re Denley), as the purpose is the object and any benefit to the family members is too indirect and intangible. The tempting wrong answer is that willing trustees save it. Trustees cannot supply a missing beneficiary.

Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399; Re Endacott [1960] Ch 232

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Trusts Law · Formalities: declaration of trust of land

In March 2024, Hugh said to his daughter Ivy in the kitchen, in front of her partner, 'I am holding the house for you from now on; it's yours really.' Hugh continued to live in the house and nothing was written down or signed. Hugh has now died. His other children say Ivy has no interest. Ivy's solicitor looks for any later document. Which of the following best states the position?

1. The declaration is valid and enforceable, because trusts need no formalities.
2. The declaration is void, and no later writing can cure it.
3. The declaration of a trust of land is unenforceable unless there is signed writing evidencing it, though writing created later may suffice.
4. The declaration is valid only if it was made by deed in the presence of a witness.
5. The declaration is enforceable because Ivy has lived near the house for years.

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Answer: C. A declaration of trust of land must be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the person able to declare the trust (LPA 1925, s 53(1)(b)). Non-compliance makes the trust unenforceable, not void, so later signed writing (for example a letter admitting the trust) can satisfy the section as evidence. Hugh's words in the kitchen are not enough. A deed is not required. Section 53(2) preserves resulting, implied and constructive trusts, so Ivy might still argue one of those. The tempting wrong answer is that trusts need no formalities. That is true only for trusts of personalty.

Law of Property Act 1925, s 53(1)(b), (2)

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Trusts Law · Formalities: disposition of an equitable interest

Abel is the sole beneficiary under a bare trust of 5,000 shares in a private company, held by trustees. Abel telephones the trustees and says, 'From now on hold the shares for my daughter Beth instead of me.' The trustees agree. Nothing is signed. Abel dies a month later and his will leaves everything to his son Carl. Beth's solicitor asks whether Beth is entitled to the shares. Which of the following is correct?

1. Yes: the trustees agreed, and so the equitable interest passed to Beth.
2. Yes: shares are personalty, so no formalities are needed for any dealing with them.
3. No: Abel's interest could be assigned only by a deed registered with the company.
4. No: a direction to hold on trust for another is a disposition of a subsisting equitable interest, and s 53(1)(c) LPA 1925 requires signed writing.
5. Yes: Beth gave no consideration but equity will perfect a voluntary assignment.

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Answer: D. A disposition of a subsisting equitable interest must be in writing signed by the person disposing of it, or their agent (LPA 1925, s 53(1)(c)). An oral direction by an absolute beneficiary to his trustees to hold the property for someone else is a disposition within the section (Grey v IRC). Abel's telephone instruction is therefore ineffective, and the shares pass under his will to Carl. This differs from the creation of a new trust over personalty by the owner, which needs no formality. The tempting wrong answer is that shares are personalty, so no writing is needed. Section 53(1)(c) applies to equitable interests in any property.

Law of Property Act 1925, s 53(1)(c); Grey v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] AC 1

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Criminal Liability · Actus reus: omissions

Ahmed agreed to look after his bedridden elderly aunt, Sabiha, who had no other carer. He moved into her house and for months fed and washed her. He then became resentful, stopped bringing her food and refused to call a doctor although she was plainly weakening. Sabiha died of malnutrition. Ahmed did not intend her to die. The Crown considers a charge of manslaughter. Which statement about Ahmed's liability is most accurate?

1. He cannot be liable because a failure to act is never enough for homicide unless a statute creates a duty to act.
2. He can be liable only if he intended Sabiha to die, because an omission cannot support a manslaughter charge otherwise.
3. He can be liable because, having assumed the care of a dependent relative, he owed her a duty and his omission can supply the actus reus.
4. He can be liable because any person related by blood to a vulnerable adult owes a duty to keep that person alive.
5. He can be liable only if a written contract obliged him to care for Sabiha and he was being paid to do so.

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Answer: C. An omission can be the actus reus of a result crime where the defendant owes a duty to act. Recognised sources include a voluntary assumption of care for a dependent person. In R v Stone and Dobinson, defendants who took in a frail relative and then failed to get help were convicted of manslaughter. Ahmed took on the care of a dependent relative who had no other carer, so he owed her a duty. His failure to feed her or summon a doctor was a breach that caused her death, and a jury could find it gross (R v Adomako). The mistaken view in option 0 is tempting, but the common law recognises duties beyond statute. Contract is only one source of duty, and blood relationship alone is not the test.

R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354; R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171

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Criminal Liability · Causation: thin skull rule

Dana stabbed Eleni in the stomach during a fight. Eleni, a devout Jehovah's Witness, was taken to hospital where doctors said she needed a blood transfusion to survive. Because of her religious beliefs she refused it. She died from blood loss two days later. Dana's lawyer argues that Eleni's refusal of treatment broke the chain of causation. Which statement is most accurate?

1. The chain is broken, because a victim who refuses reasonable medical treatment is always the sole cause of the later death.
2. The chain is broken, because Dana could not have foreseen that Eleni would refuse treatment for religious reasons.
3. The chain is broken, because the refusal was a voluntary act by a free and informed adult who understood the consequences.
4. The chain is not broken unless the court decides that Eleni's beliefs were unreasonable by the standards of ordinary people.
5. The chain is not broken, because the stab wound remained an operating and substantial cause and the defendant takes the victim as found.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: E. Under the thin skull rule, a defendant takes his victim as he finds her. This covers physical conditions and also the victim's beliefs and temperament. In R v Blaue, the victim was stabbed and, as a Jehovah's Witness, refused a transfusion. The Court of Appeal held that the stab wound was still an operating and substantial cause of death. Dana's unlawful act caused the injury and Eleni's response did not make Dana's contribution insignificant. Option 3 is tempting, but the court does not test the reasonableness of the victim's beliefs. The question is whether the defendant's act remained a significant cause.

R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411

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Criminal Liability · Causation: medical treatment

Gareth stabbed Kofi in the abdomen. Kofi was rushed to hospital and had emergency surgery. During his recovery a nurse made a minor mistake in his post-operative care, and Kofi developed a complication from which he died two weeks later. Medical experts agree that without the stab wound he would not have needed the treatment. Gareth is charged with murder. Which statement about causation is most accurate?

1. Gareth is not liable, because any negligence in medical treatment breaks the chain of causation.
2. Gareth remains a legal cause, because the wound was still a significant cause and the treatment was not so independent and potent as to make his contribution insignificant.
3. Gareth is not liable, because the death must be the sole and direct result of the stabbing for homicide.
4. Gareth remains a legal cause only if the medical error was a deliberate act rather than a mistake.
5. Gareth is not liable unless a doctor confirms that proper treatment would have meant that Kofi would certainly have died anyway.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: B. The defendant's act must be a factual and a legal cause of death, though it need not be the only cause. Negligent medical treatment breaks the chain only if it is so independent of the defendant's act, and so potent in causing death, that the original contribution is insignificant (R v Cheshire; R v Jordan for 'palpably wrong' treatment). Where the original wound is still an operating and significant cause, the chain is not broken. Here the wound required treatment, and a minor error in care is an ordinary risk of that treatment. Option 0 is tempting but wrong: not all negligence is enough, only treatment so extraordinary that the original wound is merely the setting.

R v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844; R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152

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Criminal Liability · Coincidence of actus reus and mens rea

Lloyd hit Mark hard on the head with a spade, intending to kill him. Believing that Mark was dead, Lloyd rolled the body over a low cliff to make the death look like an accident. Post-mortem evidence showed that Mark had been alive after the blow and died of exposure at the bottom of the cliff. Lloyd is charged with murder. He argues that he did not intend to kill Mark when he rolled him over the cliff. Which statement is most accurate?

1. Lloyd can be convicted only of attempted murder, because the final act was not accompanied by an intention to kill.
2. Lloyd can be convicted only of manslaughter, because the act that caused death was done without the intention to kill.
3. Lloyd cannot be convicted of any homicide offence, because the actus reus and the mens rea did not coincide at one moment.
4. Lloyd can be convicted of murder, because the acts formed one series of events and the mens rea was present at the start.
5. Lloyd can be convicted of murder only if the prosecution proves that Mark's death by exposure was virtually certain.

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Answer: D. The actus reus and mens rea must coincide, but the courts do not require this at a single instant. Where a defendant does a series of acts forming one transaction, it is enough that he had the mens rea at some point during it. In Thabo Meli the defendants struck the victim intending to kill and then threw him over a cliff believing him dead. He died of exposure. They were guilty of murder. Lloyd's blow and the disposal of the body were one series of acts, so murder is correct. Option 1 is tempting, but a lack of intent at the final act does not reduce the offence.

Thabo Meli v R [1954] 1 WLR 228; R v Church [1966] 1 QB 59

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Criminal Liability · Mens rea: intention

Rashid was angry with his neighbours. He poured petrol through their letterbox late at night and set it alight, saying he wanted only to frighten them into moving. He knew that the family was asleep upstairs. A child died in the fire. Rashid says he did not want anyone to die. At his murder trial the judge directs the jury on intention. Which direction is correct?

1. The jury must find intention if death was a probable consequence of Rashid's act, whether or not he realised it.
2. The jury may find intention if death or serious injury was a virtual certainty from his act and he appreciated that this was so.
3. The jury may find intention to kill only if causing death was Rashid's aim or purpose, and nothing less will do.
4. The jury may find intention to kill if Rashid was reckless as to whether death might result from setting the fire.
5. The jury may find intention to kill if an ordinary prudent person would have seen death as a serious risk.

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Answer: B. Intention is normally the defendant's aim or purpose. Where the case calls for it, the jury is directed that it is entitled, but not bound, to find intention if death or serious harm was a virtual certainty (barring a miracle) as a result of the defendant's act, and the defendant appreciated that this was so (R v Woollin). Rashid knew that a family slept upstairs and that petrol at the door would almost certainly kill or seriously injure someone, so the jury may find intention despite his lack of desire for death. Option 2 is tempting but too narrow: aim or purpose is not the only form of intention. Foresight of probability or recklessness is not enough.

R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82; R v Matthews and Alleyne [2003] EWCA Crim 192

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Criminal Liability · Mens rea: recklessness

Jenny, an adult, finished a cigarette while walking behind a shop and flicked it into an open skip containing cardboard and rubbish. She did not think about whether it might cause a fire. The skip caught fire and the heat damaged the back wall of the shop. Jenny is charged with criminal damage, which requires intent or recklessness. She says she never thought of any risk. Which statement is most accurate?

1. She is not reckless unless she was aware of a risk of damage and it was unreasonable for her to take that risk.
2. She is reckless, because an ordinary prudent person would have seen the obvious risk of fire from the cigarette.
3. She is reckless, because carelessness about an obvious risk of damage is enough for the offence.
4. She is not reckless, because only an intention to damage property can satisfy the mens rea for the offence.
5. She is reckless, because the offence is one of strict liability once damage results from her act.

Show answer and explanation

Answer: A. Recklessness in criminal damage is subjective. The defendant is reckless if she is aware of a risk that damage will occur or exist and, in the circumstances known to her, it is unreasonable to take it (R v G). Jenny never considered any risk, so she did not have the necessary awareness, however obvious the risk might have appeared to others. The earlier objective test in Caldwell was overruled in G. Option 1 is tempting because it describes that old test. Carelessness is a matter for civil law or negligence-based offences. Criminal damage is not strict liability and recklessness suffices, so option 3 is also wrong.

R v G [2003] UKHL 50; Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1)

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Criminal Law and Practice · Powers of arrest

PC Dunn sees Mehmet leave a supermarket with an unpaid bottle of wine worth £40. She has reasonable grounds to suspect him of theft. Mehmet gives his full name, shows a driving licence confirming his home address, and is calm and cooperative. PC Dunn arrests him because she is annoyed by his attitude. She has no other reason for arrest. Which statement best describes the arrest?

1. It is lawful, because reasonable suspicion of an offence is enough to justify an arrest.
2. It is lawful, because theft is an indictable offence and arrest is always permitted.
3. It is lawful, because PC Dunn is entitled to take into account his attitude.
4. It is unlawful, because reasonable suspicion is not enough without a necessity reason listed in section 24(5).
5. It is unlawful, because a constable may arrest only with a warrant for an offence of this value.

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Answer: D. Under s 24 of PACE 1984 a constable may arrest without a warrant anyone she reasonably suspects of committing an offence, but only if she has reasonable grounds to believe arrest is necessary for one of the reasons in s 24(5). These include ascertaining the person's name or address, preventing injury or damage, protecting a vulnerable person, allowing a prompt and effective investigation, and preventing disappearance. Mehmet's identity is established and none of the reasons applies, so the arrest is unlawful. Suspicion alone, however strong, does not satisfy the necessity limb.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 24

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Criminal Law and Practice · Police station advice

Kelly is arrested for common assault and taken to the police station. She asks the custody officer for a solicitor. The officer says the interview will start now and she can speak to a solicitor afterwards, because it is only a minor offence. Kelly's own solicitor, Mr Ahmed, arrives and asks to see her. Which statement best describes Kelly's right to legal advice?

1. She may consult a solicitor privately at any time, and the interview must not start until she has had the chance to do so, subject to narrow exceptions.
2. She may delay seeing a solicitor only if the custody officer agrees that the offence is minor.
3. She may see a solicitor only after the interview, because common assault is a summary offence.
4. She may consult a solicitor only if her case has been referred to the Crown Prosecution Service.
5. She may consult a solicitor only after the first review of detention by an inspector.

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Answer: A. Section 58 of PACE 1984 entitles a person held at a police station to consult a solicitor privately at any time, if she asks. Police may delay access only in limited cases. Delay is possible only for an indictable offence, must be authorised by a superintendent or above, and must be based on reasonable grounds such as risk of interference with evidence or witnesses. Common assault is a summary offence and nobody has authorised any delay. Under Code C an interview should not start until she has had the advice she asked for, unless a narrow exception applies.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 58; PACE Code C, para 6.1 and Annex B

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Criminal Law and Practice · Detention

Tom was arrested at 8.00 am on Monday on suspicion of burglary and arrived at the police station at 8.30 am. He has not been charged. It is now 6.00 am on Tuesday and the officers say they need more time to examine CCTV and forensic material. The inspector who conducted reviews is not senior enough to authorise more time. Who can authorise Tom's continued detention without charge beyond 24 hours?

1. The custody officer, if the CCTV evidence is likely to be important.
2. The reviewing inspector, once, for a further 12 hours.
3. A police sergeant, if the offence is indictable.
4. A magistrates' court, which must make an order before 24 hours expire.
5. A superintendent or above, for up to 36 hours in total, if conditions in section 42 are met.

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Answer: E. Under s 41 of PACE 1984 a person may normally be held for 24 hours from the relevant time, which here is his arrival at the station at 8.30 am. For an indictable offence such as burglary, s 42 allows an officer of at least superintendent rank to authorise detention up to 36 hours in total if satisfied that it is necessary to secure or preserve evidence or obtain it by questioning, and that the investigation is being conducted diligently and expeditiously. Beyond 36 hours, only a magistrates' warrant of further detention (ss 43 and 44) can extend detention, up to 96 hours in total. The custody officer and inspector have no such power.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ss 41 and 42; Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ss 43 and 44

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Criminal Law and Practice · Interview and professional conduct

You are the duty solicitor advising Bilal, who is suspected of arson. In your private consultation he tells you he set the fire. He then says that in the interview he will tell the police he was at his sister's house all evening, and he asks you to sit in silently. What advice is consistent with the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors?

1. Advise him that the account is a matter for him, and stay silent in the interview.
2. Advise him to answer questions truthfully or to say nothing, and tell him you cannot take part in giving a false account to the police.
3. Advise him to give the sister's address and then ask the officers to disclose their evidence.
4. Tell the police privately that his account will be false so they are not misled.
5. Advise him to give the false account but to withhold the sister's name.

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Answer: B. Paragraph 1.4 of the Code prohibits you from misleading or attempting to mislead others, including through acts or omissions or by being complicit in a client's acts. Your duty of confidentiality in para 6.3 stops you telling the police what Bilal told you. You may advise him of his options: to answer truthfully, make no comment, or provide a prepared statement. His right to silence is protected. But you cannot assist in advancing an account you know to be false. If he insists, you should consider whether you can continue to act. Sitting silently while he lies makes you complicit.

SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, para 1.4; SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, para 6.3; SRA Principles 2019, Principles 4 and 5

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Criminal Law and Practice · Adverse inferences

Sana is interviewed about a robbery. The officers tell her only that she is suspected of robbery on Friday at a petrol station. Her solicitor advises her to make no comment because disclosure is thin. She follows that advice. At trial she gives an alibi that she was at work, which she did not mention in interview. The prosecution asks the judge for a direction under section 34 of the CJPOA 1994. Which statement best describes the position?

1. No inference may be drawn, because Sana acted on her solicitor's advice.
2. An inference must be drawn, because she failed to mention the alibi.
3. The jury may draw an inference only if they conclude she could reasonably have been expected to mention the alibi when questioned.
4. An inference may be drawn only if the solicitor gives evidence of the advice.
5. An inference may be drawn only if the alibi is proved to be false.

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Answer: C. Section 34 of the CJPOA 1994 allows the court or jury to draw such inferences as appear proper where a defendant relies at trial on a fact she failed to mention when questioned, and which in the circumstances she could reasonably have been expected to mention. Legal advice to remain silent is a relevant circumstance, particularly where disclosure was inadequate, but it is not an automatic bar (R v Condron). The jury asks whether the silence was reasonable and whether she genuinely relied on the advice. Inference is permissive, never mandatory.

Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 34; R v Condron [1997] 1 WLR 827

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Criminal Law and Practice · Identification

A witness, Mrs Obi, saw a man snatch a handbag from a woman at a bus stop. She says she would recognise him again. Police later arrest Dev, who says the witness has the wrong man. He disputes that he was there. Mrs Obi has not yet been shown any images of Dev. Which procedure under PACE Code D should police ordinarily follow to test her identification?

1. A video identification procedure, unless it is not practicable or another procedure is more suitable.
2. An informal showing of Dev's photograph to Mrs Obi at the police station.
3. A confrontation between Mrs Obi and Dev in the custody suite.
4. No procedure, because identification is a matter for the court only.
5. A group identification at a public place, which police may choose without regard to the circumstances.

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Answer: A. Where a witness says she could identify a suspect and the suspect disputes it, Code D requires an identification procedure. The first option is a video identification procedure, unless it is not practicable or another procedure, such as a group identification or identity parade, is more suitable. Confrontation is a last resort, and showing a single photograph invites a mistaken identification and could lead to exclusion of the evidence. The suspect should be told his rights, and his solicitor can attend and raise concerns about the images chosen.

PACE Code D, section 3 and Annex A; Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 78

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